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CONSIDERING WHICH LABOR TERMS A DEBTOR MAY 
IMPOSE ON ITS UNION AFTER REJECTING A COLLECTIVE 
BARGAINING AGREEMENT UNDER § 1113 
 
ABSTRACT 
Section 1113 of the Bankruptcy Code provides courts with a comprehensive 
set of criteria for determining when chapter 11 debtors can reject collective 
bargaining agreements during bankruptcy. When courts approve rejection, 
however, § 1113 and the rest of the Code are silent about which labor terms 
debtors may unilaterally impose on their unions. On the rare occasions when 
courts and the National Labor Relations Board have addressed this issue, they 
have followed one of two approaches. The first approach limits debtors to 
imposing only labor terms found in their “last, best offer” to unions before 
filing a § 1113 motion. The second approach, however, permits debtors to 
impose any labor terms found in any pre-§ 1113 proposals, subject to court 
approval. 
This Comment argues that courts should follow the second approach. The 
post-§ 1113 scenario when debtors unilaterally impose labor terms is 
equivalent to the nonbankruptcy scenario of bargain to impasse when 
employers are permitted to impose terms from any pre-impasse proposals. 
Applying a similar approach to the post-§ 1113 scenario would enable courts 
to act consistently in each case. Limiting the terms that a debtor may impose to 
those of its “last, best offer” would encourage undesirable behavior by the 
employer, including negotiating in bad faith, failing to meet with the union at 
reasonable times, and engaging in unlawful surface bargaining. Finally, under 
the two most commonly applied models of negotiation, the likelihood of the 
parties reaching a negotiated agreement is higher if debtors have flexibility to 
impose terms from any pre-§ 1113 proposal. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Section 1113 of the Bankruptcy Code (“Code”) lays out guidelines for 
courts to follow in evaluating whether to permit debtors to reject collective 
bargaining agreements during bankruptcy.1 After an employer files for chapter 
11, but before filing a § 1113 motion to reject a collective bargaining 
agreement, the Code requires the debtor to negotiate with its union in an effort 
to reach a modified collective bargaining agreement that averts the need to 
completely reject the existing agreement.2 If those negotiations fail, courts may 
approve rejection of a collective bargaining agreement if the debtor satisfies 
the requirements found in § 1113.3 While the Code guides courts in approving 
rejection, it is silent about which labor terms debtors may impose on their 
unions following rejection.4 
Courts and the National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”) have utilized 
two different approaches when determining which labor terms a debtor may 
unilaterally impose on its union after rejecting a collective bargaining 
agreement. One approach, friendly towards organized labor, is to limit the 
permissible terms to only those found in the debtor’s “last, best offer” to its 
union before receiving court approval to reject the existing agreement.5 A 
second approach, friendly towards employers, is to permit the debtor to impose 
any labor terms found in any proposal made to the union during the mandatory 
pre-§ 1113 negotiations, including those found in its initial § 1113 proposal.6 
This Comment argues that the second approach giving debtors broad 
latitude to impose any labor term from any pre-§ 1113 proposal is the best 
approach for courts and the NLRB to follow. Part I provides an overview of 
the manner in which courts and the NLRB treated the intersection of labor law 
and bankruptcy law prior to Congress passing § 1113, and discusses the criteria 
 
 1 See 11 U.S.C. § 1113 (2012). 
 2 Id. § 1113(b)(1)(B)(2). 
 3 Id. § 1113(c). 
 4 See id. § 1113. 
 5 See, e.g., N.Y. Typographical Union No. 6 v. Maxwell Newspapers, Inc. (In re Maxwell Newspapers, 
Inc.), 981 F.2d 85, 92 (2d Cir. 1992) (granting § 1113 approval permitting rejection of collective bargaining 
agreement, but limits debtor to imposing labor terms from its last, best offer). 
 6 Advice Memorandum from the NLRB Office of the Gen. Counsel to W. Bruce Gillis, Jr., Reg’l 
Director of Region 27, Mile-Hi Metal Sys., Inc., No. 27-CA-9241 et al., 1997 WL 731480, at *12–13 (July 30, 
1986) [hereinafter Mile-Hi Metal Memo] (NLRB prevents debtor from imposing 40% wage cuts on employees 
because debtor may only impose terms “encompassed by [any] proposals that the employer presented to the 
union” during pre-§ 1113 negotiations). 
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for rejecting a collective bargaining agreement found in § 1113. Part II 
highlights the lack of precedent in both court decisions and NLRB rulings 
regarding which labor terms debtors should be permitted to impose following 
rejection. It also draws a comparison to the analogous situation outside 
bankruptcy of “bargain to impasse,” and suggests that bankruptcy courts 
should adopt a similar standard that permits employers to impose any terms 
“reasonably comprehended” in any pre-§ 1113 proposal. 
Part III discusses the perverse incentives debtors would have during 
negotiations if limited to imposing only terms from their “last, best offer” to 
unions. If courts gave debtors broad latitude in the terms they could impose, 
however, the incentive structure during negotiations would encourage desirable 
behaviors while discouraging undesirable ones. Finally, Part IV examines the 
two most common models of negotiation—the economic and problem-solving 
models—and shows that an agreement is more likely under each model if 
courts permit debtors to impose terms from any pre-§ 1113 proposal if 
negotiations fail. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. Rejecting Collective Bargaining Agreements in Bankruptcy Prior to § 1113 
1. 11 U.S.C. § 365(a) 
Before Congress adopted § 1113 in 1984, courts looked to § 365(a) of the 
Code when considering whether to permit debtors to reject collective 
bargaining agreements.7 Section 365(a) gives courts broad authority to permit 
debtors to unilaterally decide whether to “assume or reject any executory 
contract or unexpired lease . . . .”8 The Code does not define what the term 
“executory contract” actually means, but courts typically interpret the term 
broadly.9 This gives debtors wide latitude to reject contracts under the 
 
 7 See NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 521, 523 (1984); 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 
¶ 365.02[1], 365.03[5] (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer eds., 16th ed. 2013). 
 8 See 11 U.S.C. § 365(a); see also 3 COLLIER, supra note 7, ¶ 365.02[1], 365.03[5].  
 9 3 COLLIER, supra note 7, ¶ 365.03[2](a). The legislative history of § 365 indicates approval for the 
definition espoused by Professor Vernon Countryman, who defined executory contracts as those “under which 
the obligation of both the bankrupt and the other party to the contract are so far unperformed that the failure of 
either to complete performance would constitute a material breach excusing performance of the other.” Vernon 
Countryman, Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy: Part I, 57 MINN. L. REV. 439, 460 (1973); see also S. REP. 
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“business judgment test” if they apply their best business judgment and 
determine it is in the best interests of the estate.10 Prior to Congress adopting 
§ 1113, courts considered collective bargaining agreements to be executory 
contracts that could be rejected by debtors under this simple and deferential 
“business judgment” standard.11 
2. Mixed Early Precedent on the Labor Law Implications of Rejecting 
Collective Bargaining Agreements in Bankruptcy 
While courts held broad authority under § 365(a) to approve the rejection 
of collective bargaining agreements as executory contracts, many were unsure 
of the best way to handle the intersection of labor law and bankruptcy law. In 
particular, courts handed down mixed rulings about whether trustees and 
debtors were subject to unfair labor practice charges under the National Labor 
Relations Act (“NLRA”) if they rejected collective bargaining agreements 
while in bankruptcy.12 
In Durand v. NLRB,13 the trustee for the debtor rejected a collective 
bargaining agreement with Local Union Number 2746, United Brotherhood of 
Carpenters and Joiners of America, AFL-CIO.14 The union responded by filing 
an unfair labor practice charge with the NLRB alleging unlawful unilateral 
 
NO. 95-989, at 58 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5844; H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 347 (1977), 
reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6303. 
  10 3 COLLIER, supra note 7, ¶ 365.03[2]; see also Grp. of Inst. Investors v. Chi., Milwaukee, St. Paul & 
Pac. R.R., 318 U.S. 523, 550 (1943) (citation omitted) (“[T]he question whether a lease should be rejected and, 
if not, on what terms it should be assumed is one of business judgment.”); Orion Pictures Corp. v. Showtime 
Networks, Inc. (In re Orion Pictures Corp.), 4 F.3d 1095, 1099 (2d Cir. 1993) (“[A] bankruptcy court 
reviewing a trustee’s or debtor-in-possession’s decision to assume or reject an executory contract should 
examine [the] contract and the surrounding circumstances and apply its best ‘business judgment’ to determine 
if it would be beneficial or burdensome to the estate to assume it.”); Control Data Corp. v. Zelman (In re 
Minges), 602 F.2d 38, 43 (2d Cir. 1979); Allied Tech., Inc. v. R.B. Brunemann & Sons, Inc. (In re Allied 
Tech., Inc.), 25 B.R. 484, 495 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1982) (“As long as assumption of a lease appears to enhance 
a debtor’s estate, [c]ourt approval of a debtor in possession’s decision to assume the lease should only be 
withheld if the debtor’s judgment is clearly erroneous, too speculative, or contrary to the provisions of the 
Bankruptcy Code, and particularly of 11 U.S.C. § 365.”).  
  11 Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. at 522 (citation omitted) (“Any inference that collective-bargaining 
agreements are not included within the general scope of § 365(a) because they differ for some purposes from 
ordinary contracts . . . is rebutted by the statutory design of § 365(a) and by the language of § 1167 of the 
Bankruptcy Code.”).  
  12 See 3 COLLIER, supra note 7, ¶ 365.03[5](a); see also infra Part III.A.  
 13 Durand v. NLRB (In re Turney Wood Prods., Inc.), 296 F. Supp. 1049 (W.D. Ark. 1969). 
 14 Id. at 1051. 
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modifications of the collective bargaining agreement.15 The trustee countered 
by arguing that the NLRB had no jurisdiction in the case because the employer 
was in bankruptcy.16 The NLRB, however, found that it did have jurisdiction, 
and that the trustee had in fact engaged in unfair labor practices.17 The trustee 
appealed the ruling to the district court, but the court sided with the NLRB, 
reasoning “Congress has not seen fit to insulate a receiver or trustee in 
bankruptcy from the jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board as far 
as unfair labor practices are concerned.”18 
In contrast, the bankruptcy court in Shopmen’s Local Union Number 455 v. 
Kevin Steel Products, Inc.19 allowed the debtor to reject its collective 
bargaining agreement with Shopmen’s Local Union Number 455 International 
Association of Bridge, Structural and Ornamental Iron Workers, AFL-CIO.20 
This led the union to appeal to the district court, and the NLRB filed unfair 
labor practice charges against the debtor.21 After the district court found in 
favor of the union, the debtor appealed to the Second Circuit.22 
Contrary to both the district court and Durand, the Second Circuit ruled in 
favor of the debtor, holding that it could reject the collective bargaining 
agreement without committing an unfair labor practice because “a debtor in 
possession . . . is not the same entity as the [prebankruptcy] company. A new 
entity is created with its own rights and duties . . .” and is not subject to the old 
collective bargaining agreement.23 Thus, no unfair labor practices accrue 
against the new, postpetition entity for voiding the collective bargaining 
agreement of the old, prepetition entity.24 
 
 15 Id. 
 16 Id. 
 17 Id. 
 18 Id. at 1051, 1055. 
 19 Shopmen’s Local Union No. 455 v. Kevin Steel Prods., Inc., 519 F.2d 698 (2d Cir. 1975). 
  20 Id. at 700. 
  21 Id. 
  22 Id. The district court held that it did not have authority to authorize the rejection of a collective 
bargaining agreement in light of the NLRA, despite the broad authority provided under § 365(a). Id. 
 23 Id. at 704. 
 24 Id. 
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3. NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco25 
The uncertainty about how to treat overlapping labor and bankruptcy issues 
in lower courts ultimately led the Supreme Court to grant certiorari in NLRB v. 
Bildisco & Bildisco. The Court confronted two key issues. First, the Court 
sought to dictate the conditions under which a bankruptcy court could permit a 
debtor to reject a collective bargaining agreement.26 Second, the Court wished 
to determine whether the NLRB could find a debtor guilty of committing an 
unfair labor practice for unilaterally terminating or modifying a collective 
bargaining agreement.27 
a. Heightened Standard for Approving Rejection 
To shed light on the first issue, the Court began by re-establishing the 
premise that collective bargaining agreements are executory contracts under 
§ 365(a) of the Code.28 The NLRB did not dispute this premise, but, citing 
numerous circuit court precedents, argued instead that bankruptcy judges 
should be required to apply a stricter standard than the classic “business 
judgment” test when considering whether to permit rejection of collective 
bargaining agreements.29 The Court agreed with the NLRB, noting that due to 
the “special nature of a collective bargaining agreement . . . a somewhat 
stricter standard” should be applied to the rejection of a collective bargaining 
agreement than to the rejection of other executory contracts.30 
To apply this higher standard, the Court chose to adopt the new test 
endorsed by the Third Circuit in Bildisco, prior to the Supreme Court granting 
certiorari.31 The test allowed rejection of a collective bargaining agreement 
under § 365(a) “if the debtor can show that the [collective bargaining] 
 
 25 NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513 (1984). 
 26 Id. at 516. 
 27 Id. 
 28 Id. at 522. 
 29 Id. at 523 (citation omitted). 
  30 Id. at 524. The Court specifically rejected a simultaneous argument by the union that the debtor and 
the union should be required to bargain to impasse before a court can approve rejection of a collective 
bargaining agreement. Id. at 526–27. 
 31 Id. at 525–26 (citation omitted). When the Third Circuit heard Bildisco, it held that the debtor was 
permitted to reject the collective bargaining agreement, and that the NLRA did not apply because the “debtor 
was a ‘new entity’ not bound by the labor agreement.” Id. at 519–20 (citation omitted). It also raised the 
standard for rejecting collective bargaining agreements beyond the typical “business judgment” test, instead 
requiring the “debtor to show not only that the [collective bargaining] agreement is burdensome to the estate, 
but also that the equities balance in favor of rejection.” Id. at 520–21 (citation omitted). 
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agreement burdens the estate, and that after careful scrutiny, the equities 
balance in favor of rejecting the labor contract.”32 To appropriately balance the 
equities, a court would balance “the interests of the affected parties—the 
debtor, creditors, and employees.”33 Specifically, a court “must consider the 
likelihood and consequences of liquidation for the debtor absent rejection, the 
reduced value of the creditors’ claims that would follow from affirmance and 
the hardship that would impose on them, and the impact of rejection on the 
employees.”34 The Court added the requirement that the debtor be able to 
demonstrate “reasonable efforts to negotiate a voluntary modification have 
been made and are not likely to produce a prompt and satisfactory solution.”35 
b. No Unfair Labor Practice Violations 
In addressing the second issue, the Court examined the question of whether 
a debtor can be subject to unfair labor practice charges under the NLRA for 
unilaterally rejecting a collective bargaining agreement between the date a 
bankruptcy petition was filed and the date the bankruptcy court authorized 
rejection of the collective bargaining agreement.36 The union and the NLRB 
both argued that debtors who reject collective bargaining agreements before 
receiving court approval should be subject to unfair labor practice charges 
under the NLRA.37 The Court, however, rejected this claim, stating that 
accepting it “would largely, if not completely, undermine whatever benefit the 
debtor-in-possession otherwise obtains by its authority to request rejection of 
the agreement.”38 The Court went on to state that if courts permitted the NLRB 
to pursue unfair labor practice charges under these circumstances, it would 
practically force debtors to adhere to collective bargaining agreements that no 
longer exist, and “would run directly counter to the express provisions of the 
 
 32 Id. at 526. 
 33 Id. at 527. 
 34 Id. 
 35 Id. at 526. 
 36 Id. at 527–29. 
 37 Id. at 528–29 (citation omitted). 
 38 Id. at 529. The Court also gave a technical justification for its decision. Reasoning that § 365(g) of the 
Code regards rejection of executory contracts as a prepetition action, claims relating to rejection must be 
considered only through the normal bankruptcy claims administration process. So, charges against the debtor 
under the NLRA are precluded, and recovery can only occur through the claims administration process. Id. at 
530. 
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[Code] and to the Code’s overall effort to give a debtor-in-possession some 
flexibility and breathing space.”39 
B. 11 U.S.C. § 1113 
1. Fallout from Bildisco 
Labor unions, believing that the Bildisco decision made it too easy for 
employers to reject collective bargaining agreements in bankruptcy, lobbied 
Congress to pass legislation that would overrule the decision.40 The Court 
announced its decision in Bildisco on February 22, 1984, and just over six 
weeks later, on April 10, 1984, the Senate Committees on Labor and Human 
Resources and on the Judiciary held a joint hearing to discuss how to better 
harmonize the interplay between the NLRA and the Code.41 According to the 
Chairman of the Committee on Labor and Human Resources, Utah Senator 
Orrin Hatch, the goals of the hearing were to: 
determine what, if any, adjustments are needed to integrate 
successfully the goals of the National Labor Relations Act and the 
Bankruptcy Code. Together, these statutory schemes should function 
to ensure that a unionized debtor can undergo financial rehabilitation 
in a timely and equitable manner, without really subverting the 
collective-bargaining process or undermining the ability of a union to 
fulfill its representative responsibility on behalf of its particular 
employees.42 
Unions took full advantage of this hearing, making their disdain for the 
Bildisco decision impossible to miss. Leaders from a variety of unions and 
labor advocacy organizations, including the AFL-CIO, the Food & 
Commercial Workers Association, and the International Brotherhood of 
 
  39 Id. at 532 (citation omitted). 
  40 See 3 COLLIER, supra note 7, ¶ 365.03[5](c). The House of Representatives responded to Bildisco by 
introducing a bill one month after the Court announced its decision that would preclude unilateral rejection of 
all collective bargaining agreements in bankruptcy. The bill also required the debtor to prove that it attempted 
to “develop a complete reorganization plan at the bargaining table before ever coming to court[,]” and that 
“rejection is the only way to reorganize the business and save union jobs.” The bill did not pass the Senate, 
however, and Senator Orrin Hatch, the Chairman of the Committee on Labor and Human Resources, noted that 
if the House bill were taken up, it would “sweep endangered business right past rehabilitation into liquidation.” 
Oversight on Collective Bargaining Agreements and the Bildisco Decision: Joint Hearing Before the S. Comm. 
on Labor & Human Res., and S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong. 2 (1984) [hereinafter Hearing]. 
 41 Hearing, supra note 40, at 2. 
 42 Id. at 1. 
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Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers of America submitted 
statements to the Committees opposing the Bildisco decision.43 Laurence Gold, 
counsel for the AFL-CIO, urged the Committees to adopt new legislation to 
overrule Bildisco.44 He believed that the ruling incorrectly prioritized 
bankruptcy policy over labor policy, and erroneously interpreted Congressional 
intent based on a “very slender foundation.”45 He also criticized the ruling for 
“giv[ing] debtors a practical assurance that collective bargaining agreements 
may be repudiated with impunity, at least as long as there is some minimal 
attempt to negotiate with the union.”46 
The International Brotherhood of Teamsters echoed the AFL-CIO’s 
sentiments.47 Expressing concern that “many [employers] have attempted to 
lower costs by pursuing exploitive labor policies,” the International 
Brotherhood of Teamsters bemoaned that “[h]eavy-handed threats to file for 
bankruptcy in order to coerce sacrifices from employees have become a stock 
weapon in management’s arsenal against labor,” and “a threat to the entire 
system of collective bargaining that is so basic to our Nation’s labor policies 
and . . . to the basic structure of the American economy.”48 But the worst part 
of the Bildisco decision, according to the union, was “the fact that the decision 
effectively destroys the incentive for the parties to reach a mutually 
satisfactory solution at the bargaining table.”49 
2. Congress Enacts § 1113 
Responding to passionate lobbying from organized labor, Congress enacted 
§ 1113 of the Code on July 10, 1984 as part of the Bankruptcy Amendments 
 
 43 Id. at iii. 
 44 Id. at 62–63. 
 45 Id. 
 46 Id. at 63. Gold further decried the impact of Bildisco by stating: 
The Bildisco standard is so open-textured as to provide no limitations on the court at all. The 
factors that standard requires to be consulted are extremely complex and inherently 
incommensurate, and the entire thrust of the reorganization proceeding in such situations is to 
give great weight to the debtor’s expressed desires and to resolve all doubts in his favor. We see 
no need to speculate at any length on the possibilities. It is sufficient that those who know their 
interest best, management and unions, divide as follows: The employer community praises the 
decision, and we condemn it. The winners and losers are plain enough.  
Id. (emphasis added). 
 47 Id. at 17. 
 48 Id. at 18. 
 49 Id. 
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and Federal Judgeship Act.50 Section 1113 functionally overruled the Bildisco 
holding, and laid out three specific requirements that debtors must meet before 
courts will approve rejection of a collective bargaining agreement.51 The three 
requirements are: (1) a debtor must make a proposal for modifications to the 
existing collective bargaining agreement necessary to its reorganization based 
on the most reliable information available at the time; (2) the union must reject 
the proposal without good cause; and (3) the balance of the equities must 
clearly favor rejection of the agreement.52 
In practice, courts typically apply § 1113 by means of the analysis found in 
In re American Provision Co.,53 where the court laid out nine requirements 
extrapolated from the full Code section, including, but not limited to, the three 
requirements listed above.54 In American Provision, the debtor sought court 
approval to reject two collective bargaining agreements with the Miscellaneous 
Drivers, Helpers and Warehousemen’s Union.55 In reviewing the debtor’s 
motion, the court interpreted § 1113 to require that the following nine 
requirements be satisfied before approving rejection of a collective bargaining 
agreement:56 
1. The debtor in possession must make a proposal to the [union] to 
modify the collective bargaining agreement.57 
2. The proposal must be based on the most complete and reliable 
information available at the time of the proposal.58 
 
  50 Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333, 390 
(codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. § 1113 (2012)); see also Orange Cnty. Emps. Ass’n v. Cnty. of Orange (In 
re Cnty. of Orange), 179 B.R. 177, 182 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1995) (footnote omitted) (“Labor unions were very 
upset at the Supreme Court’s decision in Bildisco that collective-bargaining agreements were not enforceable 
in bankruptcy prior to rejection. In response, Congress passed § 1113.”); 2 THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 
2467 n.147 (John E. Higgins, Jr. et al. eds., 5th ed. 2006) (citation omitted) (“Section 1113 has been 
characterized as resulting from a major lobbying effort by labor that was directed at reducing the authority of 
the bankruptcy court and increasing the role of negotiations between parties.”). 
 51 11 U.S.C. § 1113; see also 2 THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 50, at 2468. 
 52 11 U.S.C. § 1113(c). 
 53 In re Am. Provision Co., 44 B.R. 907 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1984). 
 54 Id. at 909; see also 2 THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 50, at 2468. 
 55 Am. Provision Co., 44 B.R. at 908. 
 56 Courts have universally applied these nine criteria when considering similar motions in cases 
following American Provision. See 2 THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 50, at 2468. 
  57 Am. Provision Co., 44 B.R. at 909; see also 11 U.S.C. § 1113(b)(1)(A); Sheet Metal Workers’ Int’l 
Ass’n v. Mile Hi Metal Sys., Inc. (In re Mile Hi Metal Sys., Inc.), 899 F.2d 887, 888 (10th Cir. 1990) (citation 
omitted) (“At the heart of this matter is the requirement in [§] 1113(b)(1)(A) that the debtor make a proposal 
[to the union]. . . .”); 2 THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 50, at 2468. 
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3. The proposed modifications must be necessary to permit the 
reorganization of the debtor.59 
4. The proposed modifications must assure that all creditors, the 
debtor and all of the affected parties are treated fairly and equitably.60 
5. The debtor must provide to the [union] such relevant information 
as is necessary to evaluate the proposal.61 
 
  58 Am. Provision Co., 44 B.R. at 909; see also 11 U.S.C. § 1113 (b)(1)(A); In re Liberty Cab & 
Limousine Co., 194 B.R. 770, 776–77 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1996) (refusing to approve rejection because most 
complete and reliable information available did not underpin debtor’s proposal, and debtor did not provide this 
information to union before hearing); 2 THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 50, at 2468. 
 59 Am. Provision Co., 44 B.R. at 909; see also 11 U.S.C. § 1113 (b)(1)(A); 2 THE DEVELOPING LABOR 
LAW, supra note 50, at 2468. Most courts define “necessary” as merely making reorganization more feasible. 
See, e.g., Mile Hi Metal, 899 F.2d at 892–93 (rejecting the view that the necessity requirement means 
“absolutely necessary” and instead holding that it requires the modifications to “be directly related to the 
debtor’s financial condition” in completing a successful reorganization); Truck Drivers Local 807 v. Carey 
Transp. Inc., 816 F.2d 82, 90 (2d Cir. 1987) (“[T]he necessity requirement places on the debtor the burden of 
proving that its proposal is made in good faith, and that it contains necessary, but not absolutely minimal, 
changes that will enable the debtor to complete the reorganization process successfully.”). The Third Circuit, 
however, has taken a contrarian approach, and held that a stricter standard than mere necessity should apply. 
See Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp. v. United Steelworkers of Am., 791 F.2d 1074, 1088 (3d Cir. 1986) 
(“‘[N]ecessity’ [should] be construed strictly to signify only modifications that the trustee is constrained to 
accept because they are directly related to the Company’s financial condition and its reorganization. We reject 
the hypertechnical argument that ‘necessary’ and ‘essential’ have different meanings because they are in 
different subsections. The words are synonymous.”). 
 60 Am. Provision Co., 44 B.R. at 909; see also 11 U.S.C. § 1113 (b)(1)(A); 2 THE DEVELOPING LABOR 
LAW, supra note 50, at 2469. Courts consider a variety of factors when determining if all parties receive fair 
treatment, and state “equity requires management to tighten its belt along with labor.” In re Carey Transp. Inc., 
50 B.R. 203, 210 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985); see also Truck Drivers Local 807, 816 F.2d at 90–91 (court looks 
favorably on rejection when management and non-unionized employee groups take pay cuts, in addition to 
those requested of unions); Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel, 791 F.2d at 1091 (rejection not permitted by the court 
because no “snap-back” provision was included in the proposal that would raise wages and benefits for union 
members if company recovered strongly); Int’l Union v. Gatke Corp., 151 B.R. 211, 214 (N.D. Ind. 1991) 
(lack of “snap-back” provision permissible because of debtor’s exceptionally poor economic conditions, and 
the fact that all employee groups were similarly affected); In re K&B Mounting, Inc., 50 B.R. 460, 464 
(Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1985) (court looks favorably on concessions made by suppliers, secured creditors, taxing 
authorities, management, and non-union employees). 
  61 Am. Provision Co., 44 B.R. at 909; see also 11 U.S.C. § 1113 (b)(1)(B); 2 THE DEVELOPING LABOR 
LAW, supra note 50, at 2469. While similar to the second criterion that mandates the debtor provide 
information on which the proposal is based, this requirement forces the debtor to provide information for the 
union to evaluate the merits of the proposal itself. Am. Provision Co., 44 B.R. at 909 n.2 (emphasis added); see 
also George Cindrich Gen. Contracting, Inc. v. Indep. Haulers Bldg. Material & Constr. Drivers Local No. 341 
(In re George Cindrich Gen. Contracting, Inc.), 130 B.R. 20, 23–24 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1991) (debtor providing 
union solely with fourteen-month old, incomplete bankruptcy petition and schedules, not sufficient to satisfy 
requirement of providing union with relevant information to evaluate the proposal); In re Fiber Glass Indus., 
Inc., 49 B.R. 202, 206–07 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1985) (debtor providing union with projected cost savings from 
reorganization without also detailing that cost savings would be achieved by laying off one-third of union 
workers represents failure to meet requirement of disclosing relevant information to evaluate proposal). 
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6. Between the time of the making of the proposal and the time of the 
hearing on approval of the rejection of the existing collective 
bargaining agreement, the debtor must meet at reasonable times with 
the [union].62 
7. At the meetings the debtor must confer in good faith in attempting 
to reach mutually satisfactory modifications of the collective 
bargaining agreement.63 
8. The [union] must have refused to accept the proposal without good 
cause.64 
9. The balance of the equities must clearly favor rejection of the 
collective bargaining agreement.65 
 
 62 Am. Provision Co., 44 B.R. at 909; see also 11 U.S.C. § 1113 (b)(2); N.Y. Typographical Union No. 6 
v. Maxwell Newspapers, Inc. (In re Maxwell Newspapers, Inc.), 981 F.2d 85, 91 (2d Cir. 1992) (ten hours for 
union to evaluate and respond to debtor’s proposal before commencement of hearing to reject current 
collective bargaining agreement is sufficient); In re Amherst Sparkle Mkt., Inc., 75 B.R. 847, 852 (Bankr. 
N.D. Ohio 1987) (debtor meeting two times with union is sufficient); In re Century Brass Prods., Inc., 55 B.R. 
712, 716 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1985) (citations omitted) (not “inherently unreasonable” that debtor filed to reject 
collective bargaining agreement four days after presenting proposed modifications to union), rev’d on other 
grounds, 795 F.2d 265 (2d Cir. 1986); In re Ky. Truck Sales, 52 B.R. 797, 801 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1985) 
(debtor meeting four times with union is sufficient to constitute meeting at “reasonable times”); Am. Provision 
Co., 44 B.R. at 911 (criterion not satisfied when only one meeting occurred between debtor and union and 
debtor did not pursue union’s offer to meet further); 2 THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 50, at 2469. 
 63 Am. Provision Co., 44 B.R. at 909; see also 11 U.S.C. § 1113 (b)(2); In re Horsehead Indus., 300 B.R. 
573, 588 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2003) (citations omitted) (permitting rejection of the collective bargaining 
agreements of the first two locals, but not the third where debtor would not negotiate in good faith with 
union,); In re GCI, Inc. 131 B.R. 685, 695 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1991) (not permitting the rejection when debtor 
does not bargain in good faith, even if union also did not bargain in good faith); Ky. Truck Sales, 52 B.R. at 
801 (satisfying requirement when debtor genuinely attempts to negotiate reasonable changes to collective 
bargaining agreement, but parties’ positions are simply too far apart for agreement to be reached); In re S.A. 
Mech., Inc., 51 B.R. 130, 131–32 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1985) (holding that “take it or leave it” proposal from 
debtor to union does not constitute good faith); 2 THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 50, at 2469. 
 64 Am. Provision Co., 44 B.R. at 909; see also 11 U.S.C. § 1113 (c)(2); N.Y. Typographical Union No. 6 
v. Royal Composing Room, Inc. (In re Royal Composing Room, Inc.), 848 F.2d 345, 349 (2d Cir. 1988) 
(union rejecting debtor’s proposal is in good faith if union made compromise proposals that would satisfy its 
needs while preserving savings for the debtor, but union stonewalling and hoping that the court will reject the 
§ 1113 motion because it doesn’t satisfy other requirements for rejection does not constitute good cause); 
Bowen Enters., Inc. v. United Food & Commercial Workers Int’l Union (In re Bowen Enters., Inc.), 196 B.R. 
734, 746 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1996) (holding that union did not establish good cause for rejecting collective 
bargaining agreement when its counterproposals and cost analyses are unrealistic and a sham); In re Sierra 
Steel Corp., 88 B.R. 337, 340 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1988) (holding that union did not show good cause when it 
declined debtor’s proposal for fear of adverse consequences on collective bargaining negotiations with other 
employers); In re Salt Creek Freightways, 47 B.R. 835, 840–41 (Bankr. D. Wyo. 1985) (union rejecting debtor 
proposal on principle because it is not in employees’ best interest does not constitute good cause); 2 THE 
DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 50, at 2469. 
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The debtor bears the burden of proving to the court that it has met all nine 
requirements for rejecting the collective bargaining agreement, while the union 
has a burden of production.66 Specifically, “the union must come forward with 
evidence of a proposed modification’s illegality, and the union’s own good 
cause for rejecting the debtor’s proposal on such grounds, before the burden of 
showing legality falls on the debtor.”67 
II. THE LACK OF ON-POINT BANKRUPTCY PRECEDENT FROM COURTS AND 
THE NLRB SHOULD SHIFT FUTURE COURTS’ FOCUS TO SIMILAR LABOR LAW 
PRECEDENT 
The Code and court precedent are clear about the requirements that must be 
satisfied before a court can approve the rejection of a collective bargaining 
agreement under § 1113, but are silent on which labor terms management may 
actually impose once the court has approved the rejection.68 The Code requires 
debtors to submit a proposal to the union containing only “necessary” 
modifications to the existing collective bargaining agreement to gain court 
approval for rejection under § 1113, but once rejection is approved, the debtor 
is not limited to imposing only the exact terms contained in this pre-§ 1113 
proposal.69 Looking beyond this gap in the Code, there is also little bankruptcy 
case law that addresses what terms the debtor may impose after rejection. 
 
 65 Am. Provision Co., 44 B.R. at 909; see also 11 U.S.C. § 1113(c)(3); 2 THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, 
supra note 50, at 2469. The Second Circuit listed six considerations that other courts look to when deciding 
whether the balance of equities favors rejection. Those considerations are: 
(1) the likelihood and consequences of liquidation if rejection is not permitted; (2) the likely 
reduction in the value of creditors’ claims if the bargaining agreement remains in force; (3) the 
likelihood and consequences of a strike if the bargaining agreement is voided; (4) the possibility 
and likely effect of any employee claims for breach of contract if rejection is approved; (5) the 
cost-spreading abilities of the various parties, taking into account the number of employees 
covered by the bargaining agreement and how various employees’ wages and benefits compare to 
those of others in the industry; and (6) the good or bad faith of the parties in dealing with the 
debtor’s financial dilemma.  
Truck Drivers Local 807, 816 F.2d at 93 (citations omitted). 
 66 See Sheet Metal Workers’ Int’l Ass’n v. Mile Hi Metal Sys., Inc. (In re Mile Hi Metal Sys., Inc.), 899 
F.2d 887, 891–92 (10th Cir. 1990); see also In re Blue Diamond Coal Co., 131 B.R. 633, 643 (Bankr. E.D. 
Tenn. 1991). 
 67 Mile Hi Metal, 899 F.2d at 892. 
 68 See 11 U.S.C. § 1113. 
 69 See id. 
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As a result of bankruptcy law’s silence, the logical place for courts to turn 
for guidance is federal labor law. In particular, the scenario that occurs when 
courts have permitted rejection and debtors then impose labor terms on their 
unions is analogous to the “unilateral implementation of a proposal at impasse” 
during labor negotiations outside of bankruptcy.70 Given the similarities 
between the two scenarios71 and the lack of guidance from bankruptcy law, 
courts should adhere to the standard applied in bargain to impasse cases and 
permit debtors to impose any terms discussed during pre-§ 1113 negotiations 
instead of limiting them to imposing terms from only their “last, best offer” to 
the union. 
A. Bankruptcy Court Precedent Is Sparse in Support of Limiting the Debtor to 
Its “Last, Best Offer” 
There are just two instances in which courts have addressed this issue and 
held that a debtor is limited to imposing labor terms from only its “last, best 
offer” to the union.72 Neither court cited any controlling authority in adopting 
this approach.73 
 
 70 2 THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 50, at 2475; see also infra Part II.C.1. 
 71 See infra Part II.C.3. 
 72 N.Y. Typographical Union No. 6 v. Maxwell Newspapers, Inc. (In re Maxwell Newspapers, Inc.), 981 
F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1992); In re Condere Corp., 228 B.R. 615 (Bankr. S.D. Miss. 1998). 
 73 Some courts have also taken the position that bankruptcy courts do not have the authority to dictate the 
specific terms that a post-§ 1113 debtor may impose on its union. Section 1113(b) requires employers to make 
a proposal to the union that includes “necessary modifications” to employee benefits, but § 1113(c), which 
covers criteria that must be satisfied for courts to reject collective bargaining agreements, makes no mention of 
the court having authority to require modifications of specific terms of the agreement. See 11 U.S.C. 
§ 1113(b)–(c). As a result, some courts have interpreted § 1113 as precluding courts from dictating specific 
terms debtors must impose on unions. See, e.g., In re Ala. Symphony Ass’n, 155 B.R. 556, 572 (Bankr. N.D. 
Ala. 1993) (“Although the proposal under [§ 1113(b)(1)(A)] must provide only for necessary modifications, 
nothing on the face of the statute indicates that the modification language is folded in to subsection (c), which 
on its face speaks only in terms of rejection . . . .”), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 211 B.R. 65 (N.D. Ala. 1996); 
In re Sun Glo Coal Co., 144 B.R. 58, 61 (Bankr. E.D. Ky. 1992). But see Maxwell Newspapers, 981 F.2d at 
85, 91–92; In re Nw. Airlines Corp., 346 B.R. 307, 314–15 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006) (authorizing debtor to 
impose labor terms from an agreement approved by union leaders and rejected in a ratification vote but 
refusing to allow debtor to impose terms from earlier proposals during § 1113 negotiations), aff’d sub nom., 
Nw. Airlines Corp. v. Ass’n of Flight Attendants-CWA, 483 F.3d 160 (2d Cir. 2007); Condere Corp., 228 
B.R. at 619; In re Garafalo’s Finer Foods, Inc., 117 B.R. 363, 370 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1990) (citing § 105(a) 
along with § 1113 as jointly giving court authority to dictate terms imposed on union). 
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1. N.Y. Typographical Union No. 6 v. Maxwell Newspapers, Inc. (In re 
Maxwell Newspapers, Inc.)74 
In re Maxwell Newspapers is a prime example of an appellate court 
limiting a debtor to imposing terms from only its “last, best offer” after the 
court approves rejection of an existing collective bargaining agreement. In 
Maxwell Newspapers, the holding company of the New York Daily News was 
losing significant money operating the newspaper and consequently was 
looking for a buyer to purchase its assets.75 The company filed for chapter 11 
bankruptcy and found a buyer interested in purchasing the New York Daily 
News who conditioned his interest on getting rid of the collective bargaining 
agreement the newspaper had with its typesetters union.76 In particular, the 
potential buyer objected to a provision in the agreement that guaranteed every 
member of the union a job for life.77 
The debtor, along with the potential buyer, made an initial proposal to the 
union that would eliminate the lifetime employment provision.78 The union 
countered with a proposal calling for a “progressive reduction in the number of 
shifts worked conditioned upon a cash buyout for each union member, three 
years’ contribution to the pension and welfare funds, and an early retirement 
enhancement.”79 The parties subsequently exchanged three additional 
proposals before the debtor and potential buyer made the union a final offer.80 
The union rejected the final offer and the debtor filed a § 1113 motion to 
reject the collective bargaining agreement, which the bankruptcy court 
approved.81 The union appealed to the district court, which reversed the 
bankruptcy court’s decision because it found that the union had “good cause” 
to reject the final offer.82 The debtor appealed this decision to the Second 
 
 74 Maxwell Newspapers, 981 F.2d 85. 
 75 Id. at 87. 
 76 Id. 
 77 Id. 
 78 Id. 
 79 Id. at 88. 
 80 Id. In this final offer, the debtor and potential buyer proposed an immediate reduction in jobs from the 
current 167 to 80, eventually falling to 15, all of which would be guaranteed for thirteen years. In addition, the 
debtor and potential buyer also agreed to a small early retirement subsidy, but refused to make any continuing 
pension or welfare contributions, offering instead to make a one-time payment of $1 million to the pension 
fund. Id.  
 81 Id.  
 82 Id. at 89. 
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Circuit, which reversed the district court’s ruling, reasoning that the union did 
not have good cause to reject the final offer because it was asking for more 
money than the debtor or potential buyer could afford.83 
The Second Circuit ruled that the debtor could reject the collective 
bargaining agreement, but that it would be limited to imposing labor terms 
found in its final offer to the union.84 The court further conditioned its 
judgment on the requirement that the offers the debtor made at the end of 
negotiations “are not now to be withdrawn.”85 The court neither cited any 
authority for imposing this condition, nor provided any explanation of its 
rationale.86 
2. In re Condere Corp.87 
Likewise, in In re Condere Corp., a tire manufacturer filed for chapter 11 
bankruptcy and commenced negotiations with Local Union No. 303L of the 
United Steelworkers of America Rubber Plastic Conference to modify a 
collective bargaining agreement the parties had signed the previous year.88 
After six weeks of futile negotiations, the debtor filed a § 1113 motion to reject 
the collective bargaining agreement, which the court approved.89 
The court’s approval, however, came on the condition that the debtor could 
only impose terms from its “last, best offer” on several key points.90 Similar to 
Maxwell Newspapers, the court did not cite any authority to justify this 
limitation.91 
B. NLRB Precedent is Sporadic and Mostly Inapplicable 
With bankruptcy law’s silence on which terms the debtor may impose after 
obtaining a court’s approval for rejection of a collective bargaining agreement 
under § 1113, the next intuitive place to search for a solution is NLRB 
precedent. Like bankruptcy courts, however, the NLRB has rarely touched this 
 
 83 Id. at 89, 91.  
 84 Id. at 91–92. 
 85 Id.  
 86 Id. at 92.  
 87 In re Condere Corp., 228 B.R. 615 (Bankr. S.D. Miss. 1998). 
 88 Id. at 618–19. 
 89 Id. at 619. 
 90 Id. 
 91 See id. 
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issue, and on the few times it has, it has served only to limit debtors to 
imposing labor terms that had been proposed during pre-§ 1113 negotiations.92 
As the following cases demonstrate, the NLRB has not offered any insight into 
which particular terms debtors can impose from the proposals they do make.93 
1. Appletree Markets, Inc.94 
In Appletree Markets, Inc., the debtor filed for chapter 11 and after six 
months of negotiations with its union failed to produce a new collective 
bargaining agreement, the debtor filed a § 1113 motion to reject the existing 
collective bargaining agreement, which the bankruptcy court approved.95 
During pre-§ 1113 negotiations, the debtor had proposed decreasing health 
insurance, pension, and welfare contributions, but never reached common 
ground with its union.96 When the court approved its § 1113 motion, however, 
the debtor dropped the existing healthcare plan altogether and substituted its 
 
 92 See, e.g., Advice Memorandum from the NLRB Office of the Gen. Counsel to Michael Dunn, Reg’l 
Dir. of Region 16, Appletree Mkts., Inc., No. 16-CA-15724, 1994 NLRB GCM LEXIS 68, at *9 (Nov. 30, 
1994) [hereinafter Appletree Mkts. Memo] (stating that because the employer only proposed decreasing 
contributions to health insurance plans during pre-§ 1113 negotiations, its subsequent action to drop the 
union’s plan and substitute its own self-insurance plan was unlawful); Advice Memorandum from the NLRB 
Office of the Gen. Counsel to Federick Calatrello, Regional Director of Region 8, Amherst Sparkle Mkt., No. 
8-CA-20323 et al., 1988 NLRB GCM LEXIS 167, at *14 (Feb. 25, 1988) [hereinafter Amherst Sparkle Mkt. 
Memo] (stating that it is unlawful for an employer to suspend contributions to health, welfare, and pension 
plans because it never made such a proposal to modify contributions during pre-§ 1113 negotiations); Mile-Hi 
Metal Memo, supra note 6, at *2–3 (finding it illegal for an employer to impose 40% wage cuts after receiving 
§ 1113 approval when no wage cuts beyond 30% were “encompassed” in any pre-§ 1113 proposals). The 
NLRB has justified its position by holding that employers who attempt to unilaterally implement terms 
different than those discussed in advance of filing § 1113 motions are guilty of violating the duty imposed on 
them under the NLRA to bargain with the union, notify the union of proposed changes, and bargain them to 
impasse before implementing terms unilaterally. See Appletree Mkts. Memo, supra, at *7; Mile-Hi Metal 
Memo, supra note 6, at *12–13. 
 93 One notable exception to the NLRB’s general lack of guidance is found in Royal Composing Room, 
Inc., when the NLRB barred the employer from imposing any labor terms other than those contained in its 
“last, best offer” to the union. Advice Memorandum from the NLRB Office of the Gen. Counsel to Daniel 
Silverman, Reg’l Dir. of Region 2, Royal Composing Room, Inc., No. 2-CA-21808, 1987 NLRB GCM LEXIS 
139 (Sept. 30, 1987). But, the employer subsequently appealed the ruling to the Second Circuit, which 
ultimately permitted the employer to impose a labor term on the union from its initial § 1113 proposal, thereby 
functionally overruling the NLRB’s opinion limiting the employer to imposing terms only from its last, best 
offer. N.Y. Typographical Union No. 6 v. Royal Composing Room, Inc. (In re Royal Composing Room, Inc.), 
848 F.2d 345 (2d Cir. 1988). 
 94 1994 NLRB GCM LEXIS 68 (Nov. 30, 1994). 
 95 Appletree Mkts. Memo, supra note 92, at *1–2. 
 96 Id. at *2–3. 
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own self-insurance plan.97 The NLRB found that this action violated the 
employer’s duty to bargain under the NLRA because during pre-§ 1113 
negotiations the debtor had only proposed reducing healthcare contributions, 
not eliminating the plan entirely.98 
2. Amherst Sparkle Market99 
In Amherst Sparkle Market, the owner of a retail grocery store had been a 
party to a collective bargaining agreement with his unionized employees for 
the previous three years.100 The employer sought to renegotiate the collective 
bargaining agreement in search of more favorable terms, but when the union 
refused its proposals, the employer filed for chapter 11.101 
After filing, the debtor made a proposal to the union calling for pay cuts; 
reduced vacation days and paid holidays; a ban on “premium pay;” eliminating 
established work weeks for part-time employees; and reducing the present 
health, pension, and welfare benefits, among other reductions.102 The union 
rejected the offer.103 As a consequence, the debtor filed a § 1113 motion to 
reject the collective bargaining agreement entirely.104 The parties subsequently 
bargained for two additional months and were unable to reach an agreement, 
prompting the court to approve the § 1113 motion.105 
After gaining court approval for rejection, the debtor imposed labor terms 
on the union that included suspending pension contributions for one year and 
ceasing to make health and welfare contributions for ninety more days.106 The 
union filed an unfair labor practice charge with the NLRB over the unexpected 
changes to its “base terms,” and the NLRB agreed that the employer had 
committed a violation.107 The NLRB ruled that because the changes to the 
pension, health, and welfare contributions had not been contained in any of the 
 
 97 Id. at *4. 
 98 Id. at *8–9. 
 99 1988 NLRB GCM LEXIS 167 (Feb. 25, 1988). 
 100 Amherst Sparkle Mkt. Memo, supra note 92, at *1–2. 
 101 Id. at *4–5. 
 102 Id. at *5. 
 103 Id. 
 104 Id. 
 105 Id. at *6. 
 106 Id. at *7. 
 107 Id. at *8–9. 
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employer’s pre-§ 1113 proposals, they constituted a violation of the NLRA and 
were thus illegal.108 
3. Mile-Hi Metal Systems, Inc.109 
In Mile-Hi Metal Systems, the metal manufacturing employer filed for 
chapter 11 and, after two subsequent strikes by the union, received permission 
from the bankruptcy court to make interim adjustments to the parties’ existing 
collective bargaining agreement while the negotiations on permanent 
modifications continued.110 During the ongoing negotiations between the 
parties, the employer made proposals on several labor terms, including 
reducing wages by 30% for most union members.111 When continued 
negotiations failed to produce an agreement, the court approved the employer’s 
§ 1113 motion to reject the collective bargaining agreement entirely.112 
The employer then imposed a 40% wage cut on nearly all union members 
that was not “encompassed by the proposals that the employer presented to the 
union” during pre-§ 1113 negotiations.113 The union filed an unfair labor 
practice charge with the NLRB against the employer in response to this 
action.114 The NLRB ruled that the employer’s action was illegal because it 
“actually reduced wages by approximately 40%, more than the 30% reduction 
originally proposed by the [e]mployer and more than the 25% reduction which 
constituted its final offer.”115 As a consequence, the NLRB ruled that the 
employer had violated the NLRA.116 
 
 108 See id. at *9. 
 109 Mile-Hi Metal Memo, supra note 6, at *4. 
 110 Id. at *1; see also 11 U.S.C. § 1113(e) (2012) (granting courts authority to approve interim changes to 
collective bargaining agreements while parties negotiate permanent modifications). 
 111 Mile-Hi Metal Memo, supra note 6, at *1. Other proposed terms included reducing travel expense 
reimbursements, requiring employees to supply their own tools, permitting employees to transport tools in 
their own vehicles, permitting the employer to hire replacement workers if the union went on strike in the 
future without requiring those workers to join the union, and modifying the provision regarding appointing 
union stewards. Id. at *2. 
 112 Id. 
 113 Id. at *3. 
 114 Id. at *4. 
 115 Id. at *12–13. 
 116 Id. at *5. 
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C. Substantial Precedent Exists in the Analogous Labor Law Situation of 
Bargain to Impasse 
Given the lack of guidance from the Code and the sporadic precedent from 
bankruptcy case law and the NLRB, courts addressing the issue of which terms 
debtors may impose after rejection should look for guidance in the consistent 
precedent that addresses an analogous situation, “unilateral implementation of 
a proposal at impasse,” under federal labor law.117 Taking a cue from such 
impasse cases, bankruptcy courts should give debtors the latitude to impose 
terms discussed throughout pre-§ 1113 negotiations, including those offered in 
the initial § 1113 proposal, and should not limit the debtor to only imposing 
terms from its “last, best offer.” 
1. Bargain to Impasse 
Federal labor law precedent establishes that an employer may declare a 
legally recognizable “impasse” when “irreconcilable differences” between the 
employer and the union, after “full good faith negotiations,” lead to a 
“stalemate.”118 An employer that makes unilateral changes to labor terms 
before the parties reach a genuine impasse violates its duty to bargain with the 
union under the NLRA.119 Once the parties do reach an impasse, however, 
courts and the NLRB universally permit the employer to unilaterally impose 
any terms that were “reasonably comprehended” in any pre-impasse 
proposals.120 
A series of rulings from the NLRB have served to establish specific factors 
indicating that parties have reached a true bargaining impasse. 
a. Taft Broadcasting Co.121 
In Taft Broadcasting Co., the employer acquired a television and a radio 
station from a third party, and also assumed the collective bargaining 
 
 117 2 THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 50, at 2475. 
 118 1 id. at 988–89. 
 119 NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 745–46 (1962); see also infra Part III.A. 
 120 NLRB v. Intercoastal Terminal, Inc., 286 F.2d 957, 958 (5th Cir. 1961); see also infra Part II.C.2. In 
Katz, the Supreme Court specifically barred employers from implementing changes to labor terms that were 
not discussed during pre-impasse bargaining with the union. The Court described attempts to impose terms 
outside the scope of negotiations as “a circumvention of the duty to negotiate which frustrates the objectives of 
[the National Labor Relations Act] much as does a flat refusal” to negotiate. Katz, 369 U.S. at 743. 
 121 Taft Broadcasting Co., 163 N.L.R.B. 475 (1967). 
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agreement negotiated by its predecessor with the American Federation of 
Television and Radio Artists, AFL-CIO, Kansas City Local.122 One year later, 
the parties held the first of a series of bargaining sessions to try and reach a 
new collective bargaining agreement.123 The negotiations were contentious 
because the employer wanted an agreement representing a “substantial 
departure from the agreement then in effect,” while the union sought “a 
carryover of the old contract with increases in wage rates and fringe  
benefits . . . .”124 
The parties met more than twenty-three times over a six-month period 
without reaching an agreement.125 Despite having narrowed the gap between 
the parties to only a handful of issues, the employer declared an impasse and 
unilaterally imposed labor terms.126 The union responded by filing unfair labor 
practice charges with the NLRB, but the NLRB sided with the employer.127 In 
its ruling, the NLRB defined “impasse” as the point at which “good-faith 
negotiations have exhausted the prospects of concluding an agreement.”128 It 
defined the characteristics that should be examined in figuring out whether or 
not an impasse exists: 
Whether a bargaining impasse exists is a matter of judgment. The 
bargaining history, the good faith of the parties in negotiations, the 
length of the negotiations, the importance of the issue or issues as to 
which there is disagreement, [and] the contemporaneous 
understanding of the parties as to the state of negotiations are all 
relevant factors to be considered in deciding whether an impasse in 
bargaining exist[s].129 
The NLRB applied these factors to the case at hand and determined that the 
parties had in fact reached an impasse.130 It noted that the parties had 
“bargained in good faith with a sincere desire to reach agreement” and had met 
more than twenty-three times to negotiate, yet “progress was imperceptible on 
the critical issues and each [party] believed that, as to some of those issues, 
 
 122 Id. at 475. 
 123 Id. 
 124 Id. 
 125 Id. at 477. 
 126 Id. at 475. 
 127 Id. at 478. 
 128 Id. 
 129 Id. 
 130 Id. 
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they were further apart than when they had begun negotiations.”131 Thus, 
because the NLRB was “unable to conclude that a continuation of bargaining 
sessions would have culminated in a bargaining agreement,” it determined that 
a true impasse had in fact been reached and permitted the employer to 
unilaterally impose labor terms on the union.132 
b. Taft and Beyond 
Since deciding Taft, the NLRB has continued to use a similar definition of 
impasse, and applies the same set of factors to determine when an impasse 
exists.133 Beyond the factors laid out in Taft, however, the NLRB has also 
considered a variety of other factors in determining whether an impasse exists. 
These factors include: (1) “[w]hether there has been a strike or the union has 
consulted the employees about one;” (2) the “fluidity” of the parties’ positions; 
(3) whether the parties continued to bargain even after one side declared an 
impasse; (4) whether the parties both believe that impasse has been reached; 
(5) the union’s hostility level towards the employer, (6) the “nature and 
importance of issues and the extent of difference or opposition;” (7) the 
“bargaining history;” (8) whether either party has “demonstrated willingness to 
consider the issue further;” (9) the “duration of hiatus between bargaining 
meetings;” (10) the “number and duration of bargaining sessions;” and (11) 
any “other actions inconsistent with impasse.”134 
2. “Reasonably Comprehended” Standard in Bargain to Impasse Cases 
Federal courts consistently prevent employers from imposing terms on their 
unions that were not included in any pre-impasse proposals. This principle 
started with an early Supreme Court decision and continued with two 
subsequent opinions—one from the Fifth Circuit and another from the 
Supreme Court—that established the generally accepted modern standard: any 
 
 131 Id. 
 132 Id. In response to the union’s argument that no impasse existed because only a few issues remained to 
be solved for an agreement to be reached, the court stated that “an impasse is no less an impasse because the 
parties were closer to agreement than previously, and a deadlock is still a deadlock whether produced by one 
or a number of significant and unresolved differences in positions.” Id. 
 133 See, e.g., A.M.F. Bowling Co., 314 N.L.R.B. 969, 978 (1994) (citations omitted) (defining impasse as 
“the point in time of negotiations when the parties are warranted in assuming that further bargaining would be 
futile. Both parties must believe that they are at the end of their rope.”). 
 134 2 THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 50, at 990–94. 
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post-impasse terms imposed on unions must be “reasonably comprehended” 
within pre-impasse proposals. 
a. NLRB v. Crompton-Highland Mills, Inc.135 
In 1949, in NLRB v. Crompton-Highland Mills, Inc., the Supreme Court 
examined for the first time the issue of which terms an employer could impose 
on its union after bargaining to impasse.136 The employer and the union 
representing the production and maintenance employees at a cotton mill 
sparred over the terms of a new collective bargaining agreement.137 The parties 
negotiated for five months and agreed on many issues, but were unable to 
reach an agreement on the most important issue: wage increases.138 The 
employer made only one proposal to the union regarding wage increases, 
offering an additional one to one-and-a-half cents per hour, which the union 
rejected immediately.139 
The negotiations ultimately reached impasse and, twelve days later, the 
employer unilaterally imposed a two to six cents per hour wage increase for all 
union members—a “substantially larger” increase than any it had offered 
during pre-impasse negotiations.140 The employer had not consulted with the 
union before implementing this wage increase and had not given the union an 
opportunity to negotiate the new term.141 
The NLRB ruled this action by the employer constituted an unfair labor 
practice, and, after the district court and the Fifth Circuit refused to uphold the 
NLRB’s findings, the case reached the Supreme Court.142 The Supreme Court 
reversed the two lower court decisions, and upheld the NLRB’s ruling, thereby 
precluding employers from implementing terms “which are substantially 
different from, or greater than, those which the employer has proposed during 
its [pre-impasse] negotiations” with the union.143 This holding marked the first 
 
 135 NLRB v. Crompton-Highland Mills, Inc., 337 U.S. 217 (1949). 
 136 See generally id. 
 137 Id. at 219. 
 138 Id. at 218. 
 139 Id. at 221. 
 140 Id. 
 141 Id. 
 142 Id. at 220. 
 143 Id. at 225. The Court wrote that the core problem was that the new wage term was nowhere to be 
found in any of the employer’s pre-impasse proposals. Id. at 224–25. Had the proposed wage term been 
included in any pre-impasse proposals, there would have been no problem with the employer imposing the 
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time the Court had limited the terms an employer may impose on its union to 
those contained within pre-impasse proposals, and was a clear victory for the 
NLRB. 
b. NLRB v. Intercoastal Terminal, Inc.144 
In 1961, the Fifth Circuit in NLRB v. Intercoastal Terminal, Inc. built on 
the Supreme Court’s decision in Crompton-Highland Mills and created a 
standard now applied universally by courts and the NLRB in determining 
which labor terms an employer may impose on its union after bargaining to 
impasse. In Intercoastal Terminal, the employer owned two businesses that 
were jointly treated as a single employer under the NLRA.145 The first 
business, named Intercoastal Terminal, Inc., was a plant that received, stored, 
and shipped oil field materials owned by its customers, while the second 
business, named Louisiana Processing Company, Inc., was a plant that ground 
and processed barium sulphate.146 Two months before the workers in each 
plant jointly unionized, the employer announced that it was modifying its 
vacation policy, effective the following year, to give both black and white 
employees equal vacation time.147 
After the employees unionized, the parties held nine bargaining sessions 
where they exchanged numerous proposals without reaching an agreement, 
ultimately reaching an impasse.148 Shortly thereafter the employer’s business 
slowed down, causing it to unilaterally reduce the work schedules of most 
union members and to quietly rescind the vacation policy it had announced 
before the union formed.149 In response, the union filed a complaint with the 
NLRB alleging a variety of unfair labor practices.150 Chief among them was 
that the employer had violated the NLRA by unilaterally altering the 
employees’ work schedules and changing the vacation policy for a group of 
 
term because it would “carry no disparagement of the collective bargaining proceedings” and may “be 
welcomed by the bargaining representative, without prejudice to the rest of the negotiations.” Id. (citations 
omitted). 
 144 NLRB v. Intercoastal Terminal, Inc., 286 F.2d 954 (5th Cir. 1961). 
 145 Id. at 955. 
 146 Id. 
 147 Id. 
 148 Id. After the ninth session, the employer offered to memorialize with the union the issues that the 
parties had agreed upon, but the union never responded to the offer. Id. 
 149 Id. at 956–57. A few months later, the Louisiana Processing Company went out of business, and the 
employer laid off six union members. Id. at 957. 
 150 Id. at 955–57. 
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union employees.151 The NLRB ruled in favor of the union on both charges 
and the employer appealed.152 
The appeal reached the Fifth Circuit, which held the employer had not 
erred by altering the employees’ work schedules when the parties reached an 
impasse, but had erred when it altered the vacation policy.153 The reason the 
court found differently on the two allegations was simple: the employer’s 
ability to unilaterally alter work schedules was “reasonably comprehended 
within its earlier proposals” before the parties had reached an impasse, but the 
change to the vacation policy “was not within the area of negotiations during 
the bargaining sessions and was therefore not a permissible activity even 
following the impasse.”154 
c. Brown v. Pro Football, Inc.155 
The standard set in Intercoastal Terminal that employers may impose terms 
“reasonably comprehended” in pre-impasse proposals has since been applied 
universally by circuit courts and the NLRB in similar cases.156 The Supreme 
Court affirmed the validity of the standard in Brown v. Pro Football, Inc. In 
Brown, the collective bargaining agreement between the National Football 
League (“NFL”) and the National Football League Players Association 
(“NFLPA”) expired, causing the parties to begin negotiations toward a new 
agreement.157 
During the negotiations, the NFL proposed a plan permitting each team to 
create a “developmental squad” of up to six players who would practice with 
 
 151 Id. at 957. 
 152 Id. at 957–58. 
 153 Id. 
 154 Id. at 958–59 (emphasis added). 
 155 Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231 (1996). 
 156 See, e.g., Grondorf, Field, Black & Co. v. NLRB, 107 F.3d 882, 886 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (“When impasse 
occurs, an employer may implement only those changes reasonably falling within its pre-impasse proposal.”); 
Torrington Extend-A-Care Emp. Ass’n v. NLRB, 17 F.3d 580, 596 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding that employer may 
not delay by one month paying its employees for unused vacation days because such a term was not 
“reasonably comprehended” in pre-impasse proposals); Cuyamaca Meats v. Butchers & Food Emp’rs Pension 
Trust Fund, 827 F.2d 491, 496 (9th Cir. 1987) (“[A]fter impasse is reached an employer may unilaterally 
implement new terms of employment only if reasonably comprehended in a pre-impasse offer.”); Allen W. 
Bird II, 227 N.L.R.B. 1355, 1358 (1977) (“[I]t is well established that an employer can only make unilateral 
changes in working conditions consistent with its rejected [offers] to a union.”); 1 THE DEVELOPING LABOR 
LAW, supra note 50, at 907–08. 
 157 Brown, 518 U.S. at 234. 
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the rest of the team, play in games as substitutes for injured players, and earn a 
non-negotiable salary of $1,000 per week.158 The NFLPA rejected this 
proposal and made a counterproposal that would give each developmental 
squad member benefits similar to those of regular players and the freedom to 
negotiate their own salaries.159 The NFL rejected this counterproposal and 
negotiations on the issue eventually reached an impasse, causing the NFL to 
unilaterally impose terms from its pre-impasse proposal.160 
In response, 235 developmental squad players brought an antitrust suit 
against the NFL and its teams.161 The suit reached the Supreme Court, which 
affirmed the Intercoastal Terminal standard adopted by lower courts and the 
NLRB regarding which terms an employer could impose on its union after 
reaching an impasse.162 The Court held that “[l]abor law regulates directly, and 
considerably . . . the [post-impasse] imposition of a proposed employment 
term,” further stating that “new terms must be ‘reasonably comprehended’ 
within the employer’s [pre-impasse] proposals” because “by imposing more or 
less favorable terms, the employer unfairly undermine[s] the union’s status.”163 
3. Close Similarities Between the Bargain to Impasse and Post-§ 1113 
Scenarios Should Encourage Courts to Apply a Similar Standard for 
Employers Imposing Labor Terms Post-§ 1113 
There are many similarities between a debtor that has received court 
approval under § 1113 to reject a collective bargaining agreement in 
bankruptcy and an employer in the bargain to impasse situation outside of 
bankruptcy.164 Each scenario ends with the employer unilaterally imposing 
terms on its union after the parties have tried and failed to reach a new 
collective bargaining agreement. Before reaching this end result in each 
scenario, the law requires an employer to “meet at reasonable times”165 and 
 
 158 Id. 
 159 Id. 
 160 Id. at 234–35. 
 161 Id. at 235. 
 162 Id. at 238 (emphasis added). In addition to its labor law holding, the Court also found that an antitrust 
exemption protected the NFL from antitrust liability for its concerted action. Id. at 237. 
 163 Id. at 238 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). While the Court stated that the new terms must be 
“reasonably comprehended” within the employer’s pre-impasse proposals, it also stated the terms would 
typically be drawn from the last rejected proposals. Id. 
 164 See 2 THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 50, at 2475. 
 165 Compare 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (2012) (requiring employer to “meet at reasonable times” during 
collective bargaining), and 1 THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 50, at 849–50, 891–96, with 11 U.S.C. 
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“confer in good faith”166 with its union. Likewise, the employer in each 
scenario is precluded from imposing labor terms on its union that it had never 
proposed in pre-impasse or pre-§ 1113 negotiations.167 Furthermore, in each 
scenario, the union retains the right to strike after the employer has imposed 
terms unilaterally, which serves to deter employers from imposing overly 
onerous terms.168 
The only substantive difference between these two scenarios is that the 
post-§ 1113 scenario occurs during bankruptcy proceedings while the bargain 
to impasse scenario does not. Because the core elements of each scenario track 
one another so closely, however, the post-§ 1113 scenario functionally occurs 
when the parties have bargained to impasse during bankruptcy.169 With the 
close similarities between the two scenarios, and the lack of guidance on the 
post-§ 1113 scenario from the Code, bankruptcy case law, and the NLRB, 
future courts should turn to the consistent precedent found in federal labor law 
for the analogous bargain to impasse scenario when determining which terms 
post-§ 1113 debtors may impose on their unions. 
 
§ 1113(b)(2) (debtor must “meet at reasonable times” with union during § 1113 negotiations), and 2 THE 
DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 50, at 2469. 
 166 Compare 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (requiring employer to “confer in good faith” during collective 
bargaining), and 1 THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 50, at 827, 855–919, with 11 U.S.C. 
§ 1113(b)(2) (debtor must “confer in good faith” with union during § 1113 negotiations), and 2 THE 
DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 50, at 2469.  
 167 The NLRB has consistently held that the debtor may not impose labor terms that did not appear in any 
of its pre-§ 1113 proposals. See supra Part II.B. Likewise, the Supreme Court in NLRB v. Katz specifically 
barred employers from imposing labor terms that were not discussed during pre-impasse bargaining with the 
union. NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 743 (1962). The Court described attempts to impose terms outside the 
scope of negotiations as “a circumvention of the duty to negotiate which frustrates the objectives of [the 
NLRA] much as does a flat refusal” to negotiate. Id. 
 168 There is clear case law confirming that employees retain the right to strike after the debtor has 
unilaterally imposed labor terms following § 1113 rejection. See, e.g., In re Evans Prods. Co., 55 B.R. 231, 
234 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1985); In re Ky. Truck Sales, Inc., 52 B.R. 797, 806 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1985) (holding 
that following rejection, “employees retain the right to strike as their ultimate bargaining tool”); see also 2 THE 
DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 50, at 2475 (“[R]ejection of a collective bargaining agreement frees the 
union to strike the employer.”). Likewise, there is also case law confirming that employees retain the right to 
strike following an employer unilaterally imposing terms after impasse. See, e.g., NLRB v. McClatchy 
Newspapers, Inc., 964 F.2d 1153, 1154 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (“[The] statutory right to strike . . . [is] beyond the 
scope of the impasse rule.”). 
 169 While the bankruptcy context is a different backdrop for impasse than the non-bankruptcy context, the 
key bankruptcy policy goal for debtors is to emerge from bankruptcy with a “fresh start.” Permitting debtors 
broad authority to impose terms from any pre-§ 1113 proposal aligns with this policy goal by giving them a 
greater opportunity to gain that fresh start than would restricting their ability to impose only terms from the 
“last, best offer,” which may hinder them moving forward. ELIZABETH WARREN & JAY LAWRENCE 
WESTBOOK, THE LAW OF DEBTORS AND CREDITORS 115 (6th ed. 2008). 
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Courts and the NLRB have universally permitted post-impasse employers 
to unilaterally impose any terms on their unions that are “reasonably 
comprehended” in any pre-impasse proposals.170 The approach most similar to 
this “reasonably comprehended” standard is one that permits the debtor in 
possession to impose terms from any pre-§ 1113 proposals on the union after 
gaining court approval to reject the existing collective bargaining agreement. 
Applying a standard similar to the “reasonably comprehended” approach to 
post-§ 1113 debtors would permit courts to consistently apply the law in two 
analogous scenarios. This is the correct approach for courts to follow for 
reasons of both consistency and clarity in an area of law that otherwise lacks 
direction. 
III.  LIMITING POST-§ 1113 DEBTORS TO IMPOSING TERMS FROM THEIR “LAST, 
BEST OFFER” DISCOURAGES DESIRABLE BEHAVIOR AND ENCOURAGES 
UNDESIRABLE BEHAVIOR 
If debtors are limited to imposing only terms from their “last, best offer” to 
unions after rejection, they will be disincentivized from adhering to 
fundamental mandates in both the NLRA and § 1113 to bargain in “good faith” 
and meet with the union at “reasonable times.”171 Furthermore, without 
flexibility in the terms they may impose should negotiations fail, debtors will 
be incentivized to engage in unlawful surface bargaining172 with their unions 
because the risks of trying to make a deal and failing will be greater than those 
of being caught not genuinely trying to make a deal at all. Instead, if courts 
permit debtors to impose terms from any pre-§ 1113 proposal, the incentives 
for debtors will flip, thereby encouraging desirable behaviors under the NLRA 
and the Code while discouraging undesirable surface bargaining. 
A. National Labor Relations Act173 
The National Labor Relations Act has been the foundation of federal labor 
law since Congress passed it in 1935. The NLRA created numerous rights and 
protections for employees such as “the right to self-organization, to form, join, 
or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through a representative of 
 
 170 See supra Part II.B.2. 
 171 11 U.S.C. § 1113(b)(2); 29 U.S.C. § 158(d); see also 1 THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 50, 
at 43. 
 172 See infra Part III.D. 
 173 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–169. 
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their own choosing, and to engage in concerted activities for the purpose of 
collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection.”174 The NLRA also 
provides specific guidance on how unions should be organized internally, sets 
out unfair labor practices, and creates the National Labor Relations Board to 
adjudicate unfair labor practice claims.175 Unfair labor practices for employers 
found in the NLRA include, among others, “interfere[ing] with, restrain[ing], 
or coerc[ing] employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed” them to 
organize and bargain collectively; mistreating employees because they are in a 
union; or “refus[ing] to bargain collectively with the representatives 
of . . . employees.”176 
Chief among the policy goals of the NLRA is “encouraging the practice 
and procedure of collective bargaining . . . for the purpose of negotiating the 
terms and conditions” of union employment.177 Furthering this policy focus on 
promoting collective bargaining, § 158(d) of the NLRA clarifies the 
requirements for parties involved in collective bargaining by stating, “[T]o 
 
 174 Id. § 157. Congress amended the NLRA twelve years after passing it by enacting the Labor 
Management Relations Act of 1947 (“LMRA”). Id. §§ 401–531. The LMRA altered the NLRA by refocusing 
federal labor law on increasing rights and protections for employers instead of for employees. See id. §§ 141–
144, 167, 172–187. The LMRA gave employees the right to refrain from joining a union, made structural 
changes to the NLRB, further codified what constitutes an unfair labor practice, specifically guaranteed that 
both unions and employers could freely speak their minds without risk of committing an unfair labor practice, 
set out fundamental duties for each party during collective bargaining, altered the employee grievance process 
laid out in the NLRA, increased regulation of internal union affairs, made procedural changes to filing unfair 
labor practice charges, laid out criteria for when the NLRB should issue injunctions, and prioritized state “right 
to work” laws over union requirements. Id. §§ 141–144, 167, 172–187; see also 1 THE DEVELOPING LABOR 
LAW, supra note 50, at 41–47. 
 175 See 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–169. The NLRB must toe a delicate balance between ensuring that parties 
engage in whole-hearted collective bargaining discussions while at the same time not having the authority to 
force parties to come to an agreement or to make particular concessions. The Supreme Court in NLRB v. Am. 
Nat’l Ins. confirmed the limits of the NLRB’s power when it stated that “the [NLRA] does not compel any 
agreement whatsoever between employees and employers” and “it is equally clear that [under the NLRA] the 
[NLRB] may not, either directly or indirectly, compel concessions or otherwise sit in judgment upon the 
substantive terms of collective bargaining agreements.” NLRB v. Am. Nat’l Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395, 399, 404 
(1952). The Court did note, however, that “[e]nforcement of the obligation to bargain collectively is crucial to 
the statutory scheme,” and as such, the NLRB does the best it can to enforce the obligation in spite of its 
limitations. Am. Nat’l Ins. Co., 343 U.S. at 402. 
 176 29 U.S.C. § 158(a). Other unfair labor practices by the employer under the NLRA include “to 
dominate or interfere with the formation or administration of any labor organization or contribute financial or 
other support to it,” to discriminate “in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of 
employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization,” and “to discharge or 
otherwise discriminate against an employee because he has filed charges or given testimony under this 
subchapter.” Id. 
 177 29 U.S.C. § 151. 
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bargain collectively is the performance of the mutual obligation of the 
employer and the representative of the employees to meet at reasonable times 
and confer in good faith . . . but such obligation does not compel either party to 
agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession . . . .”178 
Under the NLRA and § 1113 of the Code, bargaining in good faith and 
meeting with the union at reasonable times are two core requirements of 
collective bargaining negotiations.179 Adherence to each of these requirements 
has been frequently litigated since Congress passed the NLRA, further 
underscoring their importance to the collective bargaining process, as well as 
the importance of aligning a debtor’s incentives to comply with each 
requirement through the terms that courts will permit debtors to impose 
following rejection.180 
B. The Duty to Bargain in Good Faith 
Many courts, beginning in 1940 with the Fourth Circuit in Highland 
Park,181 have confirmed the existence of the duty to bargain in good faith. 
Beyond merely confirming its existence, courts have consistently enforced it as 
well in a series of rulings that define what it means to bargain in good faith. 
1. NLRB v. Highland Park Manufacturing Co.182 
In Highland Park, the employer held a few meetings with its union during 
collective bargaining negotiations and received multiple proposals from the 
union without making any substantive counterproposals.183 The employer 
thought it had satisfied its bargaining obligation by merely meeting with the 
union while, at the same time, repeatedly vowing not to sign any written 
agreement with the union regardless of the proposed terms.184 
The Fourth Circuit disapproved of both the employer’s words and actions, 
and upheld the NLRB’s initial ruling that the employer had failed to bargain in 
good faith.185 The court reasoned that the “attitude and position that 
 
 178 Id. § 158(d) (emphasis added); see also 1 THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 50, at 864. 
 179 11 U.S.C. § 1113(b)(2); 29 U.S.C. § 158(d). 
 180 See infra Parts III.B–C. 
 181 NLRB v. Highland Park Mfg. Co., 110 F.2d 632 (4th Cir. 1940). 
 182 NLRB v. Highland Park Mfg. Co., 110 F.2d 632 (4th Cir. 1940). 
 183 Id. at 634. 
 184 Id. at 635. 
 185 Id. at 636. 
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[management’s] representatives assumed . . . clearly show that the [employer] 
was not then negotiating, nor did it intend to negotiate, in good faith with the 
representatives of its employees . . . .”186 The court continued that while the 
NLRA does not require that the parties agree, it does: 
require that they negotiate in good faith with the view of reaching an 
agreement if possible; and mere discussion with the representatives 
of employees, with a fixed resolve on the part of the employer not to 
enter into any agreement . . . even as to matters as to which there is 
no disagreement, does not satisfy its provisions.187 
2. NLRB v. George P. Pilling & Son Co.188 
Other courts have followed the reasoning of Highland Park, issuing rulings 
with similar definitions of good faith in order to rein in employers who fail to 
display it. The Third Circuit addressed the issue in NLRB v. George P. Pilling 
& Son Co. In Pilling, leaders of a newly formed union approached their 
employer to begin collective bargaining negotiations to which the employer 
saber-rattled that he “was not going to have any union run his business for 
him,” while threatening to close the business or lay off anyone who joined the 
union.189 Later, during negotiations, the employer rejected all of the union’s 
proposals, refused to offer any counterproposals, and attempted to circumvent 
union leadership by communicating directly with rank and file employees.190 
Similar to the Fourth Circuit’s decision in Highland Park, the Third Circuit 
found that the employer’s actions failed to satisfy the requirement to bargain in 
good faith.191 The court stated that “[b]argaining presupposes negotiations 
between parties carried on in good faith. The fair dealing which the service of 
good faith calls for must be exhibited by the parties in their approach and 
attitude to the negotiations . . . .”192 In this case, where the employer would not 
make a counterproposal, the court found that such inaction went “to support a 
want of good faith, and hence, a refusal to bargain.”193 
 
 186 Id. 
 187 Id. at 637 (emphasis added). 
 188 NLRB v. George P. Pilling & Son Co., 119 F.2d 32 (3d Cir. 1941). 
 189 Id. at 34. 
 190 Id. at 36–37. 
 191 Id. at 37. 
 192 Id. (emphasis added). 
 193 Id. 
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3. NLRB v. Montgomery Ward & Co.194 
The Ninth Circuit reached a similar conclusion in NLRB v. Montgomery 
Ward & Co.195 In Montgomery Ward, the employer, retail merchandiser 
Montgomery Ward, was engaged in collective bargaining discussions with 
unions for its retail clerks and warehousemen.196 During the negotiations, the 
employer refused to make any proposals or to proactively further the 
discussions.197 When both unions filed charges with the NLRB accusing the 
employer of failing to bargain in good faith, the employer argued that the duty 
to bargain collectively is simply “the duty to recognize the authority of the 
employee representative, to participate in such discussion as is necessary to 
avoid mutual misunderstanding, and to enter into binding agreements on such 
terms [that are] mutually acceptable.”198 The Ninth Circuit, however, 
disagreed, stating that good faith requires parties to “participate actively in the 
deliberations . . . [and] to indicate a present intention to find a basis for 
agreement, and a sincere effort must be made to reach a common 
ground . . . .”199 The court concluded that “a mere formal presence at collective 
bargaining with a completely closed mind and without this spirit of 
[cooperation] and good faith” is insufficient.200 
4. Additional Decisions Relating to the Duty to Bargain in Good Faith 
Additional decisions have further expounded on what it means to bargain in 
good faith, but all of them require, at their essence, that the parties negotiate 
“with the purpose of trying to reach an agreement.”201 In practice, courts have 
found employers to lack this requisite purpose when they have engaged in bad-
faith behaviors such as refusing union requests to negotiate,202 seeking to 
 
 194 NLRB v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 133 F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1943). 
 195 See generally id. 
 196 Id. at 679. 
 197 Id. at 683. 
 198 Id. at 686. 
 199 Id. (emphasis added). 
 200 Id. 
 201 1 THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 50, at 864; see generally, e.g., NLRB v. Sw. Porcelain 
Steel Corp., 317 F.2d 527 (10th Cir. 1963); NLRB v. Herman Sausage Co., 275 F.2d 229 (5th Cir. 1960); 
Majure v. NLRB, 198 F.2d 735 (5th Cir. 1952); NLRB v. Reed & Prince Mfg. Co., 118 F.2d 874 (1st Cir. 
1941); Cal. Girl, Inc., 129 N.L.R.B. 209 (1960). 
 202 See, e.g., Reed & Prince Mfg. Co., 118 F.2d at 885 (bad faith exists when employer “specifically 
reject[s] proffered opportunities for negotiation”). 
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undercut union authority,203 making “take it or leave it” offers,204 purposely 
stalling negotiations,205 making lowball offers,206 and refusing to sign any 
agreement.207 Likewise, in proceedings under § 1113(b)(2), courts require the 
debtor in pre-§ 1113 negotiations to display a similar purpose to reach an 
agreement with its union, and have found similar bad faith behaviors to violate 
this good faith requirement.208 
C. The Duty to Meet at Reasonable Times 
The NLRA and § 1113 each also require the employer and its union to meet 
at “reasonable times,” but neither defines what this means.209 Consequently, 
courts and the NLRB rely heavily on fact-specific inquiries in individual cases 
to determine whether the employer has met at reasonable times with its 
union.210 Below are several such cases. 
 
 203 See, e.g., id. (finding that bad faith exists when employer tries “to undercut the authority of the [u]nion 
as representative of its employees”); NLRB v. George P. Pilling & Son Co., 119 F.2d 32, 36–38 (3d Cir. 1941) 
(bad faith when employer posts notices in factories to circumvent union leadership).  
 204 See, e.g., Herman Sausage Co., 275 F.2d at 234 (employer’s take it or leave it offer reflects bad faith); 
Majure, 198 F.2d at 737–38 (holding that employer’s refusal to make any concessions from its initial proposal 
evinces bad faith “tantamount to a demand for complete unilateral control over all important terms and 
conditions of employment [that negate] the collective bargaining principle envisaged by the [NLRA]”). 
 205 See, e.g., Sw. Porcelain Steel Corp., 317 F.2d at 530–31 (holding that employer evinces bad faith by 
purposefully stalling negotiations by regularly requesting to review contract language that was previously 
agreed upon, agreeing to many matters only in principle but not committing to firm terms, and failing to make 
constructive suggestions on how to improve the contract language at issue). 
 206 See, e.g., Gadsden Tool, Inc., 327 N.L.R.B. 164, 170 (1998) (finding bad faith when employer made 
only lowball offers, even though ultimately accepted by the union). 
 207 See, e.g., id. at 171 (stating that bad faith is displayed when employer verbally agrees to terms with 
union but refuses to sign written contract). 
 208 See, e.g., In re Horsehead Indus., Inc., 300 B.R. 573, 590 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2003) (permitting rejection 
of the collective bargaining agreements of the first two locals, but prohibiting rejection of the third because 
debtor neglected to negotiate in good faith with the third union local); In re GCI, Inc. 131 B.R. 685, 695 
(Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1991) (prohibiting rejection where debtor does not bargain in good faith, even if union also 
did not bargain in good faith); In re Am. Provision Co., 44 B.R. 907 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1984) (finding that 
debtor did not negotiate in good faith where after only one meeting, union indicated desire to negotiate further 
but debtor did not attempt to do so). 
 209 11 U.S.C. § 1113(b)(1)(B)(2) (2012); 29 U.S.C. § 158(d); see also 1 THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, 
supra note 50, at 849. 
 210 See, e.g., N.Y. Typographical Union No. 6 v. Maxwell Newspapers, Inc. (In re Maxwell Newspapers, 
Inc.), 981 F.2d 85, 91 (2d Cir. 1992) (finding that duty to meet at reasonable times is satisfied when debtor 
meets with union for ten hours total under the circumstances of the case); In re Ky. Truck Sales Inc., 52 B.R. 
797, 801 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1985) (four meetings between debtor and union sufficient); Am. Provision Co., 44 
B.R. at 910–11 (insufficient when debtor only meets once with union and declines requests to meet further). 
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1. Richard Mellow Electrical Contractors Corp.211 
In Richard Mellow, an electrical contracting company and its union, the 
International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers Local 81, were scheduled to 
begin negotiations on a new collective bargaining agreement shortly before the 
existing one lapsed.212 The union attempted to start the negotiations by mailing 
the employer an initial proposal and suggesting several potential meeting 
times.213 The parties held a brief meeting a month later and the employer 
promised to “get back” to the union shortly about scheduling another 
meeting.214 The employer did not get back to the union as promised, and 
ignored two voicemails from union representatives attempting to schedule 
meetings.215 
The employer finally submitted a proposal to the union three months later 
and the parties met again two months after the proposal was submitted.216 
During this meeting, the parties were unable to make significant progress.217 
The union subsequently proposed three possible future meeting times and the 
employer declined all three, telling the union it would “get back to [it] to set up 
a meeting sometime in the next two weeks,” but never did.218 The NLRB ruled 
the employer’s actions “clearly fall far short of its obligation to meet at 
reasonable times and to bargain with the [u]nion,” and held the employer had 
committed an unfair labor practice.219 
 
 211 Richard Mellow Elec. Contractors Corp., 327 N.L.R.B. 1112 (1999). 
 212 Id. at 1115. Relations between the two parties had been contentious from the start. When the union 
first organized, the employer resisted the organizing campaign strongly enough that the union filed unfair labor 
practice charges as a result of the employer’s actions. Id. at 1112. The parties ultimately settled, but not 
without the employer admitting guilt in “interrogating employees about their union activities . . . threaten[ing] 
to reclassify employees as apprentices, [threatening to] close its shop and reopen under a new name with new 
employees; creating the impression of surveillance; promising benefits; announcing new benefits; and granting 
a wage increase to discourage employees from voting for union representation.” Id. 
 213 Id. at 1115. 
 214 Id. 
 215 Id. at 1116. 
 216 Id. 
 217 Id. 
 218 Id. 
 219 Id. 
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2. Caribe Staple Co.220 
In Caribe Staple Co., the employer was an Illinois based corporation that 
manufactured staples at a factory in Puerto Rico.221 After its factory workers 
joined Union General De Trabajadores De Puerto Rico in October 1991, the 
union initiated collective bargaining negotiations and the parties traded 
proposals via mail through the end of January 1992.222 The parties also agreed 
to meet for three days at the end of March for face-to-face negotiations, but 
when the employer’s representatives arrived in Puerto Rico they announced 
that they were unable to meet on the third scheduled day.223 
After the March meetings, the employer only agreed to meet with the union 
three more times before cutting off negotiations.224 The union requested 
meetings in April, June, and September, but the employer delayed each 
proposed meeting by a few weeks, causing the parties to meet at a later date 
every time.225 The employer refused to schedule more than three consecutive 
days of meetings during each session and capped daily meetings at four hours 
and fifteen minutes.226 Further, at each set of meetings the employer found 
reasons to meet for less time than the parties had originally agreed upon.227 
The NLRB ruled the employer did not satisfy its duty to meet with the 
union at reasonable times, noting that “considerations of personal convenience, 
including geographic or professional conflicts, do not take precedence over the 
statutory demand that the bargaining process take place with expedition and 
regularity.”228 The NLRB held that four trips by company management from 
Chicago to Puerto Rico for negotiating sessions, none of which exceeded three 
days in duration or four hours and fifteen minutes per session, evidenced “clear 
noncompliance with a duty to meet at reasonable times.”229 
 
 220 Caribe Staple Co., 313 N.L.R.B. 877 (1994). 
 221 Id. at 879. 
 222 Id. at 888. 
 223 Id. at 891. 
 224 Id. at 891–93. 
 225 Id. 
 226 Id. at 890–92. 
 227 Id. at 891–92. In May, the employer cancelled the last two days of meetings in response to union 
vandalism of employer property. Id. In July, the employer reduced the scheduled meeting times on the last two 
days of talks, and in October, the employer walked out on the third day of negotiations in protest over an 
unwanted representative the union brought. Id. 
 228 Id. at 893. 
 229 Id. 
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3. Sparks Nugget, Inc. v. NLRB230 
In Sparks Nugget, the employer and the union representing its employees, 
Hotel Employees and Restaurant Employees International Union, Local 86, 
AFL-CIO, were unable to reach a collective bargaining agreement, and as a 
consequence the union filed unfair labor practice charges against the 
employer.231 Chief among these charges was that the employer would not meet 
with the union at “reasonable times.”232 The union had requested that the 
parties negotiate in the first place, and asked that the sides meet “regularly and 
often” to get a deal done.233 The employer, however, would only agree to 
“short, intermittent bargaining sessions” because its managers were 
“businessmen, and they have to take care of business.”234 When the union 
offered to work around the employer’s schedule so that more regular and 
lengthier meetings could be scheduled, the employer refused.235 
The NLRB ruled the employer’s actions did not comply with the 
requirement to meet at reasonable times, and the Ninth Circuit upheld that 
ruling.236 Both the NLRB and the Ninth Circuit agreed that the employer’s 
position that its “managers were businessmen, and they had to take care of 
business” confirmed that the employer was not meeting at reasonable times 
with its union, because such a statement evinced that “bargaining was not part 
of its business, but rather something to be fit in at odd moments, without regard 
to whether significant progress toward reaching agreement could be made by 
proceeding in this manner.”237 
4. Additional Decisions Relating to the Duty to Meet at Reasonable Times 
Beyond the behaviors condemned in the above cases, courts have found 
that several other negotiating behaviors violate the duty to meet at reasonable 
times. For example, employers can breach this duty when they refuse to meet 
 
 230 Sparks Nugget, Inc. v. NLRB, 968 F.2d 991 (9th Cir. 1992). 
 231 Id. at 993. 
 232 Id. at 993–94. 
 233 Id. at 992. 
 234 Id. at 992–93 (citation omitted). 
 235 Id. at 993. 
 236 Id. at 995; see also Rhodes St. Clair Buick, 242 N.L.R.B. 1320, 1323 (1979) (finding failure to meet at 
reasonable times when the union continually requests that the parties negotiate more frequently and for longer 
periods, but the employer refuses). 
 237 Sparks Nugget, Inc., 968 F.2d at 995 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). 
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unless a federal mediator is present,238 refuse to meet for two months after the 
union formed,239 require the union to submit all proposals in writing while 
refusing to meet face to face,240 or insist on negotiating exclusively through 
mailed letters over union objections.241 Each of these cases demonstrates the 
fact-specific inquiries that courts and the NLRB regularly conduct to determine 
whether employers have satisfied their duty to meet at reasonable times. 
D. Surface Bargaining 
Surface bargaining occurs when “forms of negotiation have been employed 
to conceal a purpose to frustrate or avoid mutual agreement.”242 Even if the 
employer meets with the union regularly and at length, unlawful surface 
bargaining exists if it is “merely going through the motions of bargaining.”243 
While surface bargaining is conceptually simple to understand, it can be 
difficult to identify in practice. The NLRB and courts must examine the 
“totality” of a party’s words and actions to determine if “the party is engaging 
in hard but lawful bargaining to achieve a contract that it considers desirable or 
is unlawfully endeavoring to frustrate the possibility of arriving at any 
agreement.”244 Only the latter behavior is surface bargaining. 
In Atlanta Hilton & Tower,245 the NLRB identified several behaviors 
constituting surface bargaining, including “delaying tactics, unreasonable 
bargaining demands, unilateral changes in mandatory subjects of bargaining, 
efforts to bypass the union, failure to designate an agent with sufficient 
 
 238 Riverside Cement Co., 305 N.L.R.B. 815, 818–19 (1991) (finding that the duty to meet with the union 
at reasonable times is “wholly independent of the willingness of any mediator to participate”).  
 239 Rhodes St. Clair Buick, 242 N.L.R.B. at 1323. 
 240 NLRB v. U.S. Cold Storage Corp., 203 F.2d 924, 928 (5th Cir. 1953). 
 241 NLRB v. P. Lorillard Co., 117 F.2d 921, 924 (6th Cir. 1941); see also Alle Arecibo Corp., 264 
N.L.R.B. 1267, 1273 (1982) (noting that employer’s insistence on negotiating through mailed letters and 
phone calls reflects a “callous unwillingness” to satisfy its duty to meet with the union at reasonable times). 
 242 1 THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 50, at 864; see also NLRB v. Whittier Mills, Co., 111 
F.2d 474, 478 (5th Cir. 1940) (stating that “willful obstruction of” and “purpose to defeat” collective 
bargaining negotiations constitutes surface bargaining). 
 243 1 THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 50, at 864 (citing Unbelievable, Inc. v. NLRB, 118 F.3d 
795 (D.C. Cir. 1997)); see also Maywood Do-nut Co., 248 N.L.R.B. 529, 537 (1980) (holding that surface 
bargaining exists where employer evinces attitude of not taking the negotiations seriously, refuses to send any 
company personnel to bargaining sessions or to make any counterproposals, and hesitates to schedule 
meetings). 
 244 Pub. Serv. Co. of Okla., 334 N.L.R.B. 487, 487 (2001), enforced, 318 F.3d 1173 (10th Cir. 2003); see 
also 1 THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 50, at 864–65. 
 245 Atlanta Hilton & Tower, 271 N.L.R.B. 1600, 1603 (1984). 
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bargaining authority, withdrawal of already agreed-upon provisions, and 
arbitrary scheduling of meetings.”246 While court oversight required by § 1113 
would preclude debtors from engaging in several of these behaviors, three in 
particular—delaying tactics, unreasonable bargaining demands, and 
withdrawal of already agreed upon provisions—would prove appealing to 
debtors if courts were to limit the terms they can impose when pre-§ 1113 
negotiations fail to yield an agreement.247 
1. Delaying Tactics 
In Regency Service Carts,248 the NLRB affirmed the ruling of an 
administrative judge finding that a manufacturer of hotel and restaurant 
equipment had engaged in surface bargaining with the union representing its 
employees, Shopmen’s Local Union Number 455, International Association of 
Bridge, Structural & Ornamental Iron Workers, AFL-CIO.249 The parties 
bargained for thirty-two months without reaching agreement, and it was clear 
that this was the employer’s intended result.250 
Throughout the entire process, the employer strenuously resisted 
scheduling meetings.251 When the union made several attempts over a three-
 
 246 1 THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 50, at 865–66 (quoting Atlanta Hilton & Tower, 271 
N.L.R.B. at 1603). Beyond the behaviors listed in Atlanta Hilton & Tower, the NLRB has identified other 
behaviors constituting surface bargaining that employers would be incentivized to mimic if courts do not 
provide them flexibility in imposing terms on the union after court approval of § 1113 rejection. 1 THE 
DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 50, at 866–67; see, e.g., NLRB v. Wright Motors, Inc., 603 F.2d 604, 
606–10 (7th Cir. 1979) (holding that employer who makes predictably unacceptable proposals and refuses to 
consider alternatives engages in surface bargaining); Neon Sign Corp., 229 N.L.R.B. 861, 862–63 (1977) 
(finding that surface bargaining exists where an employer rejects a union proposal, and makes a 
counterproposal but does not try to reconcile the differences between the two). 
 247 These behaviors would not be tempting for debtors if they had flexibility to impose terms from any 
pre-§ 1113 proposal, because then they could negotiate with the purpose of making a deal, instead of with the 
purpose of hedging against the possibility of imposing concessionary terms that they do not want to impose if 
negotiations fail. The next section of this Comment focuses on behaviors such as those in Atlanta Hilton, that 
are plausible under the requirements of § 1113, but there are many behaviors that courts and the NLRB have 
found to constitute surface bargaining. See, e.g., NLRB v. Fitzgerald Mills Corp., 313 F.2d 260, 268 (2d Cir. 
1963) (unilateral changes in mandatory bargaining subjects); Fairhaven Props., 314 N.L.R.B. 763, 770 (1994) 
(employer tries to bypass union by making direct offer to employees on condition that they oust union); 
Billups W. Petroleum Co., 169 N.L.R.B. 964, 973 (1968) (employer fails to designate bargaining agent with 
sufficient authority). 
 248 Regency Serv. Carts, Inc., 345 N.L.R.B. 671 (2005). 
 249 Id. at 677. 
 250 Id. at 672. 
 251 Id. at 716. 
KAPLAN GALLEYSPROOFS2 3/5/2014 9:08 AM 
2013] CONSIDERING LABOR TERMS 245 
month span to begin negotiations, the employer ignored each attempt before 
finally agreeing to meet.252 After the initial meeting, the parties were scheduled 
to meet twenty-eight more times over a two and a half year span.253 Despite 
this plan, the employer continually rejected the union’s proposed meeting 
dates, insisting instead on dates falling after the union’s final proposed date.254 
The NLRB found that the irregularity of the meetings was due to the 
employer’s refusal to make itself available, despite the union “consistently 
pressing for more frequent meetings.”255 
Beyond irregularly scheduled meetings, the employer utilized several other 
delaying tactics. When the union requested information about the employer’s 
proposals, the employer would stall.256 Of the twenty-nine total bargaining 
sessions, the employer canceled eight, and did not show up for the final one.257 
When bargaining sessions did occur, the employer limited them to three 
hours.258 Furthermore, sessions were often shortened or interrupted by the 
employer’s habit of arriving late, taking phone calls during meetings, and 
ending meetings early even when the union desired to continue negotiating.259 
The NLRB cited these “dilatory tactics” as proof that the employer engaged 
in surface bargaining.260 The NLRB stated that the “totality of the 
[employer’s] . . . conduct demonstrates that it intended to frustrate negotiations 
and prevent the successful negotiation of a bargaining agreement.”261 
2. Unreasonable Bargaining Demands 
In NLRB v. A-1 King Size Sandwiches,262 a company that produced 
sandwiches and pies for distribution to convenience stores engaged in 
contentious collective bargaining negotiations with the Hotel, Motel, 
Restaurant Employees & Bartenders Union, Local Number 737 that 
 
 252 Id. 
 253 Id.  
 254 Id. at 672. 
 255 Id. at 716. 
 256 Id. at 675. 
 257 Id. at 716. 
 258 Id. 
 259 Id. 
 260 Id. at 673. 
 261 Id. at 727 (quoting Mid-Continent Concrete, 336 N.L.R.B. 258, 261 (2001)). 
 262 NLRB v. A-1 King Size Sandwiches, Inc., 732 F.2d 872 (11th Cir. 1984). 
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represented its production and maintenance employees.263 After eighteen 
bargaining sessions in eleven months, the parties came to an agreement on a 
handful of minor issues, but were unable to reach agreement on six core 
issues.264 The union filed unfair labor practice charges, alleging that the 
employer’s bargaining positions on those six core issues, combined with its 
frequent practice of responding to union complaints about its proposals by 
making even broader proposals, constituted surface bargaining.265 
When the case reached the Eleventh Circuit, the court sided with the union. 
It held that the employer’s unreasonable demands and desire for “unilateral 
control over virtually all significant terms and conditions of employment” 
evinced surface bargaining from the employer with “little desire to work 
towards agreement of a contract.”266 
3. Withdrawal of Already Agreed Upon Provisions 
In Valley Oil Co.,267 the employer, an oil and gasoline distributor, held 
sixteen bargaining sessions over four months with the union representing its 
truck drivers, Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers Union Local 
Number 437, but the parties were unable to reach a collective bargaining 
agreement.268 When negotiations began, the parties agreed on a handful of 
issues quickly.269 After agreeing to these terms, however, the employer 
 
 263 Id. at 873. 
 264 Id. 
 265 Id. The six core issues that the union referred to were: (1) the employer’s demand of exclusive 
authority over all wage decisions; (2) the employer’s proposed extraordinarily broad “management rights” 
clause “which reserved exclusively . . . all authority customarily exercised by Management and ‘each and 
every right, power and privilege that it had ever enjoyed, whether exercised or not . . . ’”; (3) the employer’s 
proposed “zipper clause” where “the parties [waived the] right to bargain during the life of the agreement 
regarding any subject or any matter referred to or covered in the agreement or any other subject matter which 
could be considered a mandatory or permissive subject of bargaining”; (4) the employer’s proposed “no-strike 
clause” that prohibited the union from striking for either economic or unfair labor practice reasons; (5) the 
employer’s desire to retain uninhibited control over all disciplinary matters; and (6) the employer’s demand for 
full discretion over laying off and recalling employees based on productivity instead of seniority. Id.  
 266 Id. at 877; see also Pub. Serv. Co. of Okla. v. NLRB, 318 F.3d 1173, 1176–77 (10th Cir. 2003); 
Unbelievable, Inc. v. NLRB, 118 F.3d 795, 797 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (holding that surface bargaining exists where 
employer’s proposals included cuts to wages, holiday pay, and vacation pay, eliminated the pension plan, 
swapped the employer’s insurance plan for the union insurance plan, and made it easy to fire employees); 
Liquor Indus. Bargaining Grp. & Fedway Assocs., 333 N.L.R.B. 1219, 1220 (2002); Burrows Paper Corp., 
332 N.L.R.B. 82, 93–94 (2000). 
 267 Valley Oil Co., 210 N.L.R.B. 370 (1974). 
 268 Id. at 373, 383. 
 269 Id. at 383. 
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changed bargaining representatives, and then withdrew many of the previously 
agreed upon provisions.270 When the employer reneged on these terms and the 
parties held ten additional meetings without reaching an agreement, the union 
went on strike and remained on strike while the NLRB considered unfair labor 
practice charges against the employer.271 
The NLRB found that the employer committed an unfair labor practice by 
engaging in surface bargaining primarily due to its widespread withdrawal 
from agreements already reached with the union.272 The NLRB determined that 
such conduct “frustrat[ed] arrival at a contract” and “the conclusion [was] 
inescapable that the bargaining before the strike occurred was not good faith 
bargaining.”273 Once the union went on strike, the employer made a new 
proposal that included different proposed wage terms because it viewed the 
strike as “a rejection of its earlier offers.”274 The NLRB found that this 
“bargaining posture [was] designed to frustrate collective bargaining, rather 
than legitimate hard bargaining.”275 
E. Limiting the Terms Debtors May Impose to Their “Last, Best Offer” 
Discourages Bargaining in Good Faith and Meeting at Reasonable Times 
While Encouraging Unlawful Surface Bargaining 
If courts limit debtors’ ability to impose labor terms to only those found in 
their “last, best offer” at the time pre-§ 1113 negotiations fail, they will be 
disincentivized from negotiating in good faith and meeting at reasonable times 
with their unions, and instead will be incentivized to engage in unlawful 
surface bargaining. While bargaining in good faith and meeting at reasonable 
times are obligatory under the NLRA, debtors will likely fear that satisfying 
both requirements while failing to reach an agreement will mean being forced 
to impose concessionary labor terms post-§ 1113. In the debtor’s mind, this 
scenario may have worse ramifications than the alternatives of surface 
 
 270 Id. at 383–84. The employer reneged on the agreement covering wages much later than the other 
terms, after ten bargaining sessions had failed to yield an agreement and after the union went on strike. The 
employer’s new proposal for wages, which the union promptly rejected, included 3% increases across the 
board, along with the creation of new job classifications that further delineated salaries for employees based on 
whether they had three years of experience or not. Id. at 384. 
 271 Id. at 383. 
 272 Id. at 385. 
 273 Id. 
 274 Id. 
 275 Id. at 385–86. 
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bargaining or daring the union to file expensive, slow moving, unfair labor 
practice charges that may or may not result in liability for the employer.276 
Limiting debtors’ to imposing only labor terms from their “last, best offer” 
if negotiations fail would create a detrimental but powerful incentive for 
debtors to surface bargain as a means of protecting themselves. Surface 
bargaining does not benefit the union who, regardless of the debtor’s true 
intentions, must continue negotiating, nor does it benefit the debtor, who must 
spend time and money to put up a façade of genuine negotiations to satisfy the 
requirements of § 1113(b)(2).277 Debtors will likely view the time and expense 
of surface bargaining as less costly than the possibility of being forced to 
impose concessionary labor terms after genuinely attempting, but failing, to 
reach an agreement. 
By contrast, if courts allow debtors to impose terms from any pre-§ 1113 
proposal, incentives for debtors would be properly aligned with the 
requirements of the NLRA. Such flexibility would incentivize debtors to 
bargain in good faith and meet at reasonable times, while discouraging surface 
bargaining because debtors would know that if negotiations fail, they will not 
regret genuinely attempting to reach an agreement as they would if forced to 
impose labor terms only from their “last, best offer.” Thus, if negotiations fail 
and courts give debtors flexibility to impose any labor term from any pre-
§ 1113 proposal, incentives for debtors will be properly aligned with desired 
behaviors under § 1113 and the NLRA. 
IV.  UNDER THE TWO PRINCIPAL MODELS OF NEGOTIATION, THE PARTIES ARE 
MORE LIKELY TO REACH AN AGREEMENT IF COURTS ALLOW THE DEBTOR TO 
IMPOSE TERMS FROM ANY PRE-§ 1113 PROPOSALS 
If courts permit post-§ 1113 debtors flexibility to impose labor terms from 
any pre-§ 1113 proposal, the parties will be more likely, under the two most 
widely followed theoretical models of negotiation, to reach an agreement. 
Under both the economic model and the problem-solving model of negotiation, 
 
 276 In addition to uncertainty about whether liability would attach, this scenario would also preserve the 
debtor’s ability to impose preferred labor terms if negotiations fail. Meeting the requirements of the NLRA, by 
contrast, would likely entail the debtor being forced to impose concessionary and undesired labor terms that 
may be included in a “last, best offer” if the parties cannot reach agreement. 
 277 11 U.S.C. § 1113(b)(1)(B)(2) (2012) (requiring debtor to negotiate with union in good faith between 
the initial modified collective bargaining agreement proposal and when the § 1113 petition for rejection is 
made). 
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if courts permit flexibility in the terms the debtor may impose should 
bargaining fail, the debtor will be more likely to function like a rational actor 
trying earnestly to reach an agreement, because it will not have to fear the 
repercussions if negotiations fail. Similarly, unions will also feel more urgency 
to act rationally to reach an agreement because if none is reached, its members 
will be stuck working under labor terms that the debtor may impose from any 
point in the negotiations, with little union input required. 
On the contrary, if the parties must negotiate knowing that only terms from 
the “last, best offer” may be imposed if an agreement is not reached, debtors 
will function irrationally under both models by not trying sincerely to reach a 
deal, and making few, if any, concessions. Unions may also act irrationally, 
withholding offers and concessions in the hopes that the debtor will bargain 
against itself, and ultimately impose favorable “last, best offer” terms when it 
faces no alternative. Thus, because parties to most negotiations will follow one 
of these two models, it is logical for courts to permit post-§ 1113 debtors to 
impose terms from any pre-§ 1113 proposal because it maximizes the chances 
of the parties acting rationally and reaching an agreement. 
A. The Economic Model of Negotiation 
The economic model of negotiation treats bargaining “as a process of 
convergence over time involving a sequence of offers and counteroffers on the 
part of the participants.”278 Under the economic theory, each negotiation can be 
broken down into individual issues, and each issue can be visualized on a 
continuum, with extremes at each end of the continuum representing the 
optimal position for one party involved in the negotiations.279 
Each party makes a decision about where along the continuum it will begin 
negotiating, and makes an opening offer to the opposing party based on that 
decision.280 Parties typically base their opening offers on three key factors: “(1) 
 
 278 ROBERT M. BASTRESS & JOSEPH D. HARBAUGH, INTERVIEWING, COUNSELING, AND NEGOTIATING: 
SKILLS FOR EFFECTIVE REPRESENTATION 358 (1990) (quoting BARGAINING: FORMAL THEORIES OF 
NEGOTIATION 131–32 (Oran R. Young ed., 1975)). 
 279 THOMAS F. GUERNSEY & PAUL J. ZWIER, ADVANCED NEGOTIATION AND MEDIATION THEORY AND 
PRACTICE 2 (Anthony J. Bocchino et al. eds., 2005). According to the economic theory of negotiation, each 
separate issue represents a “bilateral monopoly,” or a scenario where the two parties must “come to the 
specific terms of exchange between themselves” or else the comprehensive deal they are negotiating will not 
be consummated. BASTRESS & HARBAUGH, supra note 278, at 357. 
 280 GUERNSEY & ZWIER, supra note 279, at 2. 
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a rank ordering of preferences among payoff outcomes; (2) a schedule of costs 
during the time when the parties are bargaining . . . and (3) an estimate of the 
opponent’s concession pattern over the course of negotiations.”281 Combining 
these factors with the commonly accepted notion that “a tough opening 
position will produce a better outcome for the tough bargainer’s side” enables 
each party to come up with its “most efficient opening position.”282 
As negotiations progress and the “sequence of offers and counteroffers”283 
begins, the parties will each determine where along the continuum they are 
comfortable moving and where along the continuum they will not move 
beyond, called their “bottom line.”284 Parties follow the doctrine of 
“convergence to settlement” in determining the frequency and magnitude of 
concessions they are willing to make.285 Under this doctrine, the parties watch 
each other’s behavior and concession rate, determining the best way to respond 
based on whether the behavior was expected or surprising.286 If the opponent’s 
behavior was as expected, the party sticks with its pre-negotiation concession 
plan; however, if it was unexpected, the party changes its concession plan 
based on “revised expectations” of the opposition’s behavior.287 
The area on the continuum located between each party’s opening offer and 
bottom line is commonly known as its “bargaining range.”288 When the parties’ 
bargaining ranges overlap, a “settlement zone” exists for the particular issue 
indicating that a solution acceptable to each party can be reached through the 
process of exchanging offers and counter offers.289 Each party decides whether 
to accept or reject an offer within its settlement zone by evaluating a handful of 
factors, including its “preferred outcome, the opponent’s current offer, and the 
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costs of deadlock.”290 The parties will not agree to a settlement until each 
party’s “estimate of the actual risk of deadlock” equals the party’s risk 
tolerance, causing both parties to accept the offer on the table.291 
The economic model of negotiation is grounded in the idea of placing a 
quantitative value on both tangible and intangible issues relevant to each 
party.292 When functioning as envisioned, the economic model assumes that 
the parties’ initial positions do not already fall within the settlement zone, 
requiring each party to quickly determine before trading proposals both its own 
bottom line and its estimate for that of the other party.293 Likewise, each party 
must have “values and goals” that remain constant throughout the negotiation 
so that it can identify which offers and counteroffers on a particular issue are 
better or worse as the negotiations proceed.294 
The economic model relies heavily on thorough planning and exchange of 
accurate information before and during the bargaining process.295 Parties plot 
out their negotiating strategies in advance and “anticipate the reactions of their 
opponents.”296 With such a “premium” on information, each party must act as 
a “rational decision mak[er]” in setting its bottom line and must assume that 
the opposing party is doing the same.297 If the parties act irrationally, this 
model will not function at maximum efficiency and will force the parties to 
make unjustified concessions during the bargaining process.298 
B. The Problem-Solving Model of Negotiation 
The problem-solving model of negotiation requires the parties to identify 
their own “needs, interests, and desires” in the negotiation, along with those of 
the other party, while ignoring the “bargaining positions that often mask those 
needs.”299 Problem-solvers bargain over their interests, as opposed to their 
entrenched positions, and apply a highly collaborative approach to negotiations 
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that enables the parties to “jointly create . . . win/win solution[s].”300 Under this 
model, the parties “advance proposals that invite opponents to accept, reject, or 
modify based on how the proposals intersect with their interests, [and] . . . 
explain why solutions are acceptable or unacceptable in whole or in part based 
on” analyzing each party’s needs.301 When negotiations hit a wall, problem-
solvers “seldom make concessions . . . but instead shift to another proposal that 
more completely addresses the parties’ mutual problems.”302 
Attempting to reconcile interests rather than bargaining positions is a good 
negotiating strategy for two reasons. First, there are typically multiple 
positions that could satisfy a stated interest, and although the parties in most 
negotiations simply adopt the most obvious position that fulfills the interest, 
there are often alternative positions that better meet the interests of both 
parties.303 Second, working to reconcile positions instead of compromising 
between them allows the parties to uncover “shared and compatible interests” 
that “present opportunities for discovering greater numbers of and better 
quality solutions.”304 Generally, reconciling interests “offers the possibility of 
meeting a greater variety of needs both directly and by trading off different 
needs, rather than forcing a zero-sum battle over a single issue.”305 
Once the parties have identified each other’s needs and interests, and 
attempted to reconcile those interests, they then work collaboratively to create 
mutually beneficial solutions. Any such solution must “satisfy the parties’ 
needs and interests, to achieve a result that the parties recognize as more 
advantageous to themselves and each other than the available alternatives.”306 
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By creating a more conciliatory and cooperative negotiating environment 
emphasizing reciprocal sharing of the parties’ underlying needs, creative 
solutions can be mutually developed that make each party happy and better 
preserve the long-term relationship between each side.307 
The risks associated with the problem-solving approach, however, are 
significant. Foremost among them is the potential for a breach of trust by one 
party once it has elicited the desired information.308 A party’s needs, interests, 
and desires must be shared for the problem-solving approach to function, but if 
the opposing party adopts a more adversarial approach mid-stream, “there is a 
real risk . . . that the problem-solver will reveal information valuable to the 
other side in assessment of the problem-solver’s vulnerabilities without 
correspondingly gaining information about vulnerabilities on the other side.”309 
This risk requires parties to ask themselves if “bargainers [will] be able to set 
aside selfish concerns and bargain . . . altruistically, for the long-term good of 
their opponent,” or instead, if they will “only fake these more altruistic 
concerns in order to position themselves to take advantage of the other” 
party.310 If a party does not trust its opposition enough to believe it will choose 
the former, then it should adopt a more adversarial negotiating style in lieu of 
using the problem-solving approach for the negotiations at hand.311 
C. Under Either Model, the Parties Are More Likely to Reach an Agreement if 
Courts Permit Latitude in the Terms Employers May Impose if Bargaining 
Fails 
During the bargaining that follows the economic model of negotiation, 
parties never change the particular topic being negotiated, and as negotiations 
proceed, they “shift and alter their outcome preferences along the bargaining 
continuum” for that topic until reaching either an agreement or deadlock.312 By 
contrast, during a negotiation under the problem-solving model, the parties 
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keep their “value preferences constant and shift among and between proposed 
combinations of resources until a solution that satisfies mutual needs 
emerges.”313 While the methodological underpinnings of each model vary 
widely, as applied in the § 1113 setting each model is more likely to produce 
an agreement between the parties if courts permit the debtor to broadly impose 
labor terms from any pre-§ 1113 offer, including its initial proposal. 
1. Economic Model of Negotiation 
Under the economic model, the parties each stake out positions on 
individual issues along a continuum and make concessionary offers and 
counteroffers along that continuum until both have arrived in a mutually 
agreeable “settlement zone.”314 If the debtor fears that it will be stuck imposing 
all of the concessionary terms it offers if negotiations fall apart, it will be 
hesitant to make meaningful concessions or substantial moves along the 
continuum, reducing the chances of an agreement. Likewise, the union will 
also not be interested in making concessionary moves along its continuum 
because it will not want to bargain against itself. 
For the economic model to function, each party must try to anticipate the 
movements along the continuum that the other party will make, and each party 
must act rationally in making these movements.315 If either party is hesitant to 
make meaningful concessions or moves along its continuum regardless of the 
movements of the other party, it will upset the requirement of rational action, 
and will make it unlikely that the parties ever reach the settlement zone. 
By contrast, if courts permit the debtor to impose terms from any of its pre-
§ 1113 proposals, the debtor will be free to make concessions and move along 
its continuum in an effort to reach an agreement without fearing the 
repercussions should the negotiations fail. The union will similarly be willing 
to move along its continuum with the debtor doing the same, and will be 
motivated to reach a deal to avert the possibility of the debtor having broad 
authority to unilaterally impose labor terms from any pre-§ 1113 proposal. 
Thus, if courts allow debtors to impose terms from any pre-§ 1113 proposal, it 
will encourage both parties to act rationally and make concessions, which the 
economic model requires, and will raise the likelihood of an agreement. 
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2. Problem-Solving Model of Negotiation 
Parties operating under the problem-solving model are also more likely to 
reach an agreement if courts permit the debtor to impose terms from any pre-
§ 1113 proposal should the parties fail to reach an agreement. Under the 
problem-solving model, parties are required to freely exchange information 
about their needs, interests, and desires in an effort to reach a mutually 
beneficial solution.316 This approach requires a high level of altruistic 
collaboration, and similarly requires that the parties trust one another implicitly 
to not misuse the otherwise private information being exchanged.317 
If courts limit post-§ 1113 debtors to imposing terms only from their “last, 
best offer,” both parties would have a strong incentive to avoid the cooperative 
negotiations that the problem-solving model requires. Debtors may fear the 
repercussions if the parties do not make a deal, and will have greater incentive 
to withhold “mutually beneficial” solutions that could benefit the union more 
than the employer should negotiations fail. The union would be similarly 
hesitant to offer a variety of solutions as required by the problem-solving 
model if the debtor refuses to do the same. Further, the debtor will be 
incentivized to take any private information the union offers regarding what its 
true needs, interests, and desires are, and use it to limit its own offers should it 
realize that those needs, interests, and desires are not compatible with its own. 
Having a similar incentive, the union will surely be aware of this incentive for 
the debtor and will likely respond by offering little private information as well. 
By contrast, if post-§ 1113 debtors have broader authority to impose terms 
from any pre-§ 1113 proposal, should negotiations fail, each party will be more 
likely to collaborate in order to find a mutually beneficial solution. Debtors 
will have no reason to withhold information or ideas that may work for both 
parties, because should negotiations fall apart, they will not be penalized for 
making the proposals in the first place. Similarly, unions will have no reason to 
withhold information or potential solutions because they will be motivated to 
reach a deal that precludes the debtor from unilaterally imposing the labor 
terms of its choice from any pre-§ 1113 proposal. Likewise, neither party 
would have incentive to misuse information provided by the other, because the 
focus of the negotiations will be on making a deal as opposed to limiting offers 
in the event that the parties’ needs, interests, and desires are not compatible. 
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CONCLUSION 
Courts should give debtors flexibility to impose labor terms from any pre-
§ 1113 proposal. This approach would create a consistent standard for the 
nonbankruptcy bargain to impasse scenario and the analogous post-§ 1113 
bankruptcy scenario. Flexibility in imposing terms would also encourage 
debtors to satisfy the NLRA and § 1113 requirements of bargaining in good 
faith and meeting with the union at reasonable times, and would discourage 
unlawful and undesirable behaviors such as surface bargaining. In addition, 
this approach would increase the likelihood of the parties reaching an 
agreement under the two primary models of negotiation, which is an objective 
that Congress intended to encourage in passing § 1113.318 
If courts limit debtors’ ability to impose labor terms to only those found in the 
“last, best offer,” debtors, unions, and bankruptcy courts will all lose. Debtors 
and unions will be less likely to reach mutual agreements and each will be 
incentivized to hedge against undesirable, worst case scenarios instead of to 
negotiate earnestly towards an agreement. Courts will be forced to apply 
inconsistent standards to cases in analogous bankruptcy and nonbankruptcy 
scenarios and, with the parties less likely to reach agreements on their own, 
courts will be further bogged down with lengthy bankruptcy proceedings. 
Thus, for the benefit of debtors, unions, and the court system, courts, and in 
particular appellate courts whose opinions create precedent, and district courts 
whose circuits lack precedent, should permit debtors to impose terms broadly 
from any pre-§ 1113 proposal if negotiations fail. 
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